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THE INCREMENTS OF JUSTICE: EXPLORING THE OUTER REACH OF 
AKIBA’S EDGE TOWARDS NATIVE TITLE ‘OWNERSHIP’ 
 
SIMON YOUNG* 
 
The Torres Strait regional sea claim, culminating in the High Court decision of Akiba v 
Commonwealth, signalled a new respect for the holistic relationships and dominion that 
underlay First Peoples’ custodianship of land and waters. The ‘Akiba correction’ 
centred upon a distinction between ‘underlying rights’ and specific exercises of them – 
and produced in that case a surviving right to take resources for any purpose (subject to 
current regulation). The correction emerged from extinguishment disputes, but the 
significance of this edge towards ‘ownership’ was soon evident in ‘content’ cases on the 
mainland. Yet there are new challenges coming in the wake of Akiba. What of the many 
native title determinations that have been settled or adjudicated on pre-Akiba thinking? 
And what does this renaissance in native title law offer to the communities that will fail 
(or have failed) the rigorous threshold tests of continuity – also crafted with the older 
mindset?   
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
 
The moniker of ‘ownership’ has for the most part been assiduously avoided in Australian native 
title law. That term is, of course, an imperfect reflection of the depth and sophistication of 
Indigenous relationships with land. Yet as we move beyond the 25th anniversary of Mabo v 
Queensland [No 2] (‘Mabo’),1 and the first generation of implementation and debate, it has 
become clear that we have perhaps strayed too far from this notion of ‘ownership’ – in 
particular the breadth and resilience of interest that it invokes, and the opportunities for 
adaptation and development that it can provide.2 The Australian native title doctrine, at least 
in its retelling after Mabo, has been a doctrine of detail – too often dominated by a very focused 
and un-reflexive examination and translation of ‘traditional laws and customs’. Encouraged in 
various ways by the terms of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), this exacting approach crystallised 
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1  (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
2  Notable collections include Benjamin R Smith and Frances Morphy (eds), The Social Effects of Native 
Title: Recognition, Translation, Coexistence (ANU E Press, 2007) (see, eg, the poignant comments of 
traditional owner David Claudie, ‘“We’re Tired from Talking”: The Native Title Process from the 
Perspective of Kaanju People Living on Homelands, Wenlock and Pascoe Rivers, Cape York 
Peninsula’: at 91–116); Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for 
Change and Empowerment? (Federation Press, 2015). See also Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Connection to Country: Review of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (Report No 126, April 2015) 
(‘Connection to Country Report’). 
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in the 2002 High Court decisions of Western Australia v Ward (‘Ward’)3 and Members of the 
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (‘Yorta Yorta’).4 It has impacted on the 
doctrine’s operation in many ways – including as regards approaches to extinguishment, the 
make-up of claimant groups, the complexity and cost of determination processes, and 
particularly (for present purposes) the principles governing the definition and establishment of 
the interest and the supposedly inherent conditions for its survival.     
Much has been written on the constraints of the Australian approach, and the fragility and 
fragmentation that it has tended to produce. Alongside the celebration of hard-won successes 
(from claims and agreements), there has been a strengthening chorus of concern over the deeper 
implications of this methodology. It has tended to ignore past transformation of landscapes and 
economies,5 confine and dismantle contemporary land relationships, and negate the social and 
economic opportunities that native title presented for Australia’s First Peoples.6 It has often 
been intrusive and divisive, and tended to ‘balkanise’ groups7 (pulling them away from 
regional cooperation). It has differentiated between groups based on an uncertain scale of 
Western interference, and disadvantaged those most severely affected by historical 
discrimination and oppression.8 Moreover, this approach has proven to be torturously complex 
and seems in various ways to be internally inconsistent – asking for both cultural purity and 
contemporary politico-legal engagement,9 and making the loss of ‘tradition’ both a product and 
a cause of dispossession.10 At its worst, it risked an incremental irrelevancy for the whole 
doctrine – as communities continued to adapt over time. Some of these difficulties were noted 
early by key observers,11 and there is now a quite substantial body of relevant commentary 
(amplified by recent work of the Australian Law Reform Commission).12  
As to the cause of the constrictions, we have at various times pointed to the terms of the Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth), the stubbornly adversarial nature of court processes, the overzealous 
anthropological and legal explication of community histories, and the mindsets of state and 
                                       
3  (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
4  (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
5  See, eg, Marcia Langton, ‘The Aboriginal Balancing Act’ (2013) (115) Australian Geographic 39. 
6  See Sean Brennan, ‘The Significance of the Akiba Torres Strait Regional Sea Claim Case’ in Sean 
Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? 
(Federation Press, 2015) 29, 30. 
7  Paul Finn, ‘A Judge’s Reflections on Native Title’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from Mabo 
to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Federation Press, 2015) 23, 26. 
8  See generally, Brennan (n 6) 30; Richard Bartlett, ‘An Obsession with Traditional Laws and Customs 
Creates Difficulty Establishing Native Title Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta’ (2003) 31(1) University 
of Western Australia Law Review 35. 
9  It has been noted, in the discussion of the ‘internal’ challenge of native title success, that ‘[a]ll of this is 
likely to involve the reform or even outright replacement of existing governing structures in order to 
meet future challenges’: Sean Brennan et al, ‘The Idea of Native Title as a Vehicle for Change and 
Indigenous Empowerment’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for 
Change and Empowerment? (Federation Press, 2015) 2, 3. 
10  See, eg, Lisa Strelein, ‘The Vagaries of Native Title: Partial Recognition of Aboriginal Law in the 
Alice Springs Native Title Case’ (1999) 4(26) Indigenous Law Bulletin 13. 
11  For important work through the 1990s to early 2000s (prior to the critical cases of Ward and Yorta 
Yorta), see works by Noel Pearson, Tony McAvoy, Richard H Bartlett, Hal Wootten, Gary D Myers, 
Luke McNamara and Scott Grattan, Jeremy Webber, Kent McNeil, and Lisa Strelein.   
12  See Connection to Country Report (n 2). Other contemporary commentary is discussed throughout this 
article. 
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territory governments. It would be difficult to deny that each has played a role. Yet, as will be 
seen, close examination reveals that in some respects the tightening of approach in Australia 
was an accident of the pattern and exigencies of litigation. This, together with the accumulation 
of judicial and academic unease, suggests that the 2013 breakthrough in Akiba v 
Commonwealth (‘Akiba’)13 (a recognition of subsisting broad resource use rights) was overdue 
and inevitable, that the history of political inaction on these issues is regrettable, and that we 
now have a rare opportunity to set the Australian law on a better path. 
Akiba reflects a new respect for the holistic nature of First Peoples’ relationships with land and 
waters in Australia, and for the dominion that underlay their original custodianship. This High 
Court decision (and those that quickly followed)14 was ultimately primarily focussed on 
extinguishment – but in that context the Court edged native title (back) towards ideas of 
‘ownership’. The implications of this for native title ‘content’ (and the difficult legacy of Ward) 
were readily apparent, and as will be seen much has now been written on this aspect of the 
decision and how it is playing out in the lower courts. In turn, there has now been some attention 
to consequences for the means by which rights and interests are established. These more 
conspicuous implications are reviewed in this article, however there is more to consider in the 
discussion.   
There is a new challenge coming in the wake of Akiba – potentially a new colonialistic tragedy 
in Australian legal history. Akiba was an important decision, but its beneficiaries are potentially 
limited in number. Many Australian native title determinations have been settled or adjudicated 
on the basis of earlier, more constricted understandings of the law – and, as will be seen, the 
lag in uptake of the new thinking appears likely to continue for some time. Perhaps most 
importantly, however, the explicit holdings in Akiba do little to help the communities that have 
failed (or will fail) the rigorous threshold standards of continuity and connection laid down in 
Yorta Yorta. The primary purpose of this article is to look at the Akiba line of thinking in a 
deeper legal and logical context, and help to find a broader reach for these important practical 
and intellectual advances. 
Even with this new momentum and the broader thinking from earlier judicial opposition,15 the 
tighter knots in the Australian doctrine will take some untying. Modern law tends to seek the 
precision that the Australian native title law lays claim to, and the exacting and highly focused 
approach is entangled in mutually supportive ideas (particularly since Ward and Yorta Yorta). 
Moreover, any legal recalibration must happen in the shadow of contemporary resource 
competition, and a lingering historicised view of Indigenous existence that began with a 
profound misunderstanding of its sophistication and has since long neglected its practical and 
economic dimensions.16      
                                       
13  (2013) 250 CLR 209. 
14  Karpany v Dietman (2013) 252 CLR 507; Western Australia v Brown (2014) 253 CLR 507; 
Queensland v Congoo (2015) 256 CLR 239 (all discussed below). 
15  Most prominently (as discussed further below) see the views of Lee J in Ward v Western Australia 
(1998) 159 ALR 483; North J in Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316; Kirby J in 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1 (‘Yarmirr’); Black CJ in Members of Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244; Kirby J in Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; and 
Gaudron and Kirby JJ in Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422. 
16  See also Finn, ‘A Judge’s Reflections on Native Title’ (n 7) 27; Lisa Strelein, Compromised 
Jurisprudence: Native Title Cases since Mabo (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2nd ed, 2009) 121–2 
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The Australian Law Reform Commission has recently invited parliamentary assistance on 
some of these difficult issues – but unfortunately the political intransigence on these matters is 
also deep set. Moreover, as Bret Walker SC has noted, statutes such as the Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth) tend to take on a ‘pseudo-constitutional’ aura and are unlikely to be reactively 
improved in the same way as other Acts.17 Yet clearly there is work to be done. It is difficult 
to avoid the awkward truth that the Australian native title doctrine still carries and wields the 
‘vestiges of colonising intent’.18 
 
II   AKIBA TO CONGOO – NEW THINKING ON EXTINGUISHMENT 
 
The 2013 decision in Akiba marked the High Court’s return to the native title field after some 
years of little involvement. The litigation concerned a significant sea claim in the Torres Strait 
– in the first adjudication of which Finn J had determined (critically) that the proven native title 
interests included a surviving non-exclusive right to take resources in the areas for any purpose 
(subject to government regulation).19 On key issues of extinguishment, the majority of the Full 
Federal Court (on appeal) concluded that successive fisheries legislation had in fact 
extinguished any right to take fish and aquatic life for commercial purposes.20 Yet the High 
Court upheld the survival of the broad right.21 Critically, in a marked change from the tenor of 
earlier jurisprudence,22 the High Court proceeded from the broad view of the interest taken by 
Finn J to build a new resilience for native title. The reasoning was essentially that it was wrong 
to impose a segmentation of the general right (ie, a right to take resources for any purposes) 
into sub-rights – defined, for example, by purpose23 – as that could lead to an erroneous 
                                       
(‘Compromised Jurisprudence’); Richard H Bartlett, ‘The Source, Content and Proof of Native Title at 
Common Law’ in Richard H Bartlett (ed), Resource Development and Aboriginal Land Rights in 
Australia (The Centre for Commercial and Resources Law, The University of Western Australia and 
Murdoch University, 1993) 35, 48–9; Richard H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2015) 173–6 [13.21]–[13.23]; Kent McNeil, ‘The Relevance of Traditional Law 
and Customs to the Existence and Content of Native Title at Common Law’ in Kent McNeil (ed), 
Emerging Justice?: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Native Law Centre, 
University of Saskatchewan, 2001) 416, 428–9, 443 ff.   
17  Bret Walker, ‘The Legal Shortcomings of Native Title’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from 
Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Federation Press, 2015) 14, 15. 
18  Lisa Strelein, ‘The Right to Resources and the Right to Trade’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title 
from Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Federation Press, 2015) 44, 44.  
19  Akiba v Queensland [No 3] (2010) 204 FCR 1, especially 131–7 [511]–[540]. Sea claims were limited 
to non-exclusive assertions of rights by reason of the earlier High Court decision in Yarmirr, where a 
claim had been rejected to the extent that it asserted exclusive possession – most particularly on the 
basis that recognition of public rights of navigation and fishing and the international right of innocent 
passage was necessarily inconsistent with any such exclusive native title: Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 
67–8 [94]–[100] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).         
20  Commonwealth v Akiba (2012) 204 FCR 260, 287–8 [64]–[66], [68], [70], 295–6 [87] (Keane CJ and 
Dowsett J). 
21  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 240–2 [61]–[69] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 226–33 [24]–[39] (French CJ 
and Crennan J). 
22  See especially Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 (discussed in detail below). 
23  Finn J himself had conceded that particular purposes of activity might still be severable for 
extinguishment purposes: Akiba v Queensland [No 3] (2010) 204 FCR 1, 211 [847]. 
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conclusion on extinguishment given that particular ‘exercises’, properly understood as such, 
can be merely regulated with no extinguishment of the underlying right.24   
Most immediately, this approach provides native title with a potentially very significant 
defence against piecemeal extinguishment by parliamentary or executive intrusion. An 
argument of ‘mere regulation’ is of course not new in the extinguishment jurisprudence,25 
however the important new dynamic here is the resolute emphasis on a distinction between the 
‘underlying right’ and the potentially many and varied ‘exercises’ of that right.26 As Edgeworth 
has explained in post-Akiba commentary, the Court’s thinking here offers a more ‘vertical’ and 
more robust conceptualisation of native title – over the flatter and more fragile ‘bundle of 
rights’ emphasis in Ward.27   
Three succeeding Australian High Court decisions, in part building upon key themes in Akiba, 
reveal the clear ascendancy of ‘coexistence’ over ‘extinguishment’28 in the contemporary 
Australian jurisprudence. In the 2013 decision of Karpany v Dietman (‘Karpany’),29 the 
scenario from the 1999 decision of Yanner v Eaton (‘Yanner’)30 was replayed in the context of 
a prosecution for the taking of undersized abalone. A defence was argued based on section 211 
of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), which in turn rested upon the existence of relevant 
unextinguished native title rights. Drawing broadly upon the Akiba methodology, ultimately 
the High Court unanimously held that the state fisheries legislation in question31 had not 
extinguished the relevant native title rights and that section 211 applied.32   
A more difficult set of issues presented themselves in Western Australia v Brown (‘Brown’)33 
– which related to a claim in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, and was in a sense a 
complex sequel to Wik Peoples v Queensland (‘Wik’)34 and Ward. This case squarely raised 
some unresolved questions about the practical operation of coexistence and extinguishment, 
and, as will be seen, the Akiba advances proved timely. The High Court had to consider in 
                                       
24  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 241–2 [66]–[67] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 232–3 [39] (French CJ and 
Crennan J). 
25  Notably, in Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 (‘Yanner’), a High Court majority had held that the 
vesting of ‘property’ to fauna in the Crown by conservation legislation (the Fauna Conservation Act 
1974 (Qld)) did not extinguish the native title rights relied upon by the appellant (alongside s 211 of the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)) in a defence to an unlawful taking of fauna charge.   
26  See especially Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 242 [68] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 229 [29] (French CJ 
and Crennan J). It was conceded that a right may (under a particular set of traditional laws and 
customs) be properly defined by reference to its exercise for a limited purpose – but it was emphasised 
that that need not be so and was not so in this case: at 224–5 [21] (French CJ and Crennan J), cf 241–2 
[66]–[68] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
27  Brendan Edgeworth, ‘Extinguishment of Native Title: Recent High Court Decisions’ (2016) 8(22) 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 28, 33. 
28  See, eg, Raelene Webb, ‘The 2016 Sir Frank Kitto Lecture: Whither Native Title?’ (2016) 19(2) 
Australian Indigenous Law Review 114, 123 (‘2016 Sir Frank Kitto Lecture’); Brennan (n 6) 42. 
29  (2013) 252 CLR 507. 
30  (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
31  Fisheries Act 1971 (SA). 
32  See especially Karpany (2013) 252 CLR 507, 514 [5], 518 [19], 519–20 [22] (French CJ, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).  
33  (2014) 253 CLR 507. 
34  (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
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Brown questions about extinguishment of native title by the grant of mineral leases.35 The 
Federal Court had initially concluded that the claimed rights had been extinguished in the 
locations of the actual mine, town and associated works (constructed in accordance with the 
state agreement underlying the leases) – notwithstanding that the mine and town had later 
closed down.36 Ultimately the High Court unanimously held that the mineral leases (which 
were found to be non-exclusive) did not extinguish the claimed native title.37 The Court focused 
on the nature of the mineral lease rights at the time of their grant (rather than upon their 
exercise) – at the time of grant they effectively carried a floating potential inconsistency that 
did not cause extinguishment of the native title.38 The mining lessees’ rights would take priority 
during the course of the leases (ie, where things were constructed), but that did not mean 
extinguishment.39 The Court again drew from and built on logic that underpinned Akiba. This 
is seen in the high bar set for inconsistency (did the existence of the new rights necessarily 
imply that the claimed native title rights and interests could no longer exist?).40 It is also 
particularly evident in the conclusion that interference with the exercise of the native title rights 
(by an improvement made under the leases) did not prevent the survival of the underlying 
native title.41 
The High Court handed down another important decision in 2015 – in Queensland v Congoo 
(‘Congoo’).42 This case concerned a native title claim to land in the Atherton Tablelands, part 
of which had been taken and used in World War II (by the Commonwealth) as an artillery and 
live fire manoeuvre range for training pursuant to orders under national security regulations of 
the time.43 The Commonwealth relinquished possession in 1945. The prevailing view in the 
High Court44 was that the relevant orders authorised the preclusion, for their duration, of the 
exercise of the native title rights and interests – but could not support a finding of inconsistency 
                                       
35  The context was iron ore deposits at Mount Goldsworthy in Western Australia – developed (with leases 
granted) under a state agreement approved under the Iron Ore (Mount Goldsworthy) Agreement Act 
1964 (WA).  
36  Brown v Western Australia [No 2] (2010) 268 ALR 149, see especially 205 [231] (Bennett J). The Full 
Federal Court upheld an appeal (with some division in reasoning on the key issues): Brown v Western 
Australia (2012) 208 FCR 505. 
37  Brown (2014) 253 CLR 507, 522–30 [37]–[64] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). The 
native title claim did not include a claim to control, which on the clear authority of Ward would have 
been extinguished: at 525 [46]. 
38  Ibid 522–3 [37] ff. 
39  Ibid 528 [59] ff. 
40  See especially ibid 527 [55]–[56]. 
41  Ibid 520 [27], 526 [51], see especially 529–30 [64]. Cf Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 241–2 [66]–[67] 
(Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). See also discussion of the broader importance of these points in Brennan 
(n 6) 40; Richard Bartlett, ‘The Requirement of a Clear and Plain Intention and Its Relationship to 
Equality and the Inconsistency Test in the Extinguishment of Native Title: Akiba, Brown and Congoo’ 
(2015) 34 Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 109, 126–7 (‘The Requirement of a Clear and 
Plain Intention’). 
42  (2015) 256 CLR 239. 
43  More specifically, pursuant to orders made in the 1940s under reg 54 of the National Security 
(General) Regulations 1939 (Cth) (themselves made pursuant to s 5 of the National Security Act 1939 
(Cth)). 
44  Congoo (2015) 256 CLR 239, 251–67 [1]–[40] (French CJ, Keane and Gageler JJ agreeing at 303 
[167]–[169]). The 3:3 split in the High Court was resolved (via s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 
(Cth)) in favour of the decision below (there was a majority below in favour of the native title holders: 
Congoo v Queensland (2014) 218 FCR 358). Yet the authority is somewhat weakened by the 
inconsistencies between the reasoning in High Court and the Full Federal Court (below). For further 
discussion, see Edgeworth (n 27) 31–2.   
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that would lead to a conclusion of extinguishment.45 Once again the Akiba logic – in particular 
the distinction between ‘rights’ and their ‘exercise’ – is evident in this reasoning. The critical 
regulation, it was said here, was concerned with actual possession (to be understood in its 
statutory setting) and did not authorise the conferral upon the Commonwealth of a right of 
exclusive possession (equivalent to unqualified fee simple rights to exclude all for any 
reason).46 Indeed it was noted that the regulations assumed the continuation of underlying 
rights.47 It was felt that the contention (by the State) that the Commonwealth had a right of 
exclusive possession inconsistent with native title ‘lifts the statutory conferment of 
“possession” out of its context, disconnects it from its statutory purpose, and thereby 
misconceives its legal effect’.48           
As noted above, the conspicuous importance of these cases49 for future inquiries into 
extinguishment in Australia has been carefully explored in commentary.50 There has been close 
examination of the Court’s renewed attention to the ‘clear and plain intention’ principle51 – but 
also the finer interpretative differences on this and other issues left by the awkward 3:3 split of 
the High Court in Congoo.52 There has also been attention to the practical mechanics of the 
‘higher bar’ now set for extinguishment – particularly the new space for broader and more 
resilient definitions of rights (returning from Ward’s ‘disaggregation’ under which partial 
extinguishment was easy),53 and the increased space for courts to prefer regulation over 
                                       
45  Congoo (2015) 256 CLR 239, 266–7 [39] (French CJ and Keane J), cf 300 [157], 302–3 [166] (Gageler 
J). 
46  See especially ibid 255–6 [12] (French CJ and Keane J), 301–2 [161] ff (Gageler J). 
47  Ibid 256–7 [15], 261 [24] (French CJ and Keane J). Their Honours reasoned that a ‘clear and plain 
intention’ in legislation is necessary to effect extinguishment (by legislation or by executive act 
pursuant to legislation) – and re-emphasised that a law which merely regulates the enjoyment of native 
title or creates a regime of control consistent with its continued enjoyment does not reveal the 
necessary intention. On the mechanics of approaching extinguishment by a grant pursuant to statute (a 
point of past confusion), their Honours suggested that the criterion for the satisfaction of the ‘clear and 
plain intention’ standard is ‘inconsistency’ between the rights granted and the propounded native title – 
an objective inquiry but one that begins with construction of the statute, properly informed by its 
purpose (here there was a limiting negative purpose of not disturbing subsisting rights and interests): at 
264–7 [32]–[39]. See further discussion below as to the ‘clear and plain intention’ test.    
48  Ibid 266 [37] (French CJ and Keane J), cf 301–2 [161] (Gageler J). Note that Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ 
took a different view particularly on the precise relevance of statutory ‘intention’ or ‘purpose’, and 
(critically) the nature and effect of the possession conferred by the regulations and orders in question: 
see especially at 272 [58], 282 [91] and 292 [131] respectively.  
49  See also Tjungarrayi v Western Australia (2019) 93 ALJR 556 – focused on a relatively narrow 
interpretative point (the operation of s 47B in the context of exploration tenements), but broadly 
consistent with the tenor of the succeeding High Court decisions discussed here. 
50  See also Murray v Western Australia [No 5] [2016] FCA 752, [1283]–[1297] (McKerracher J) 
(‘Murray’). 
51  Bartlett, ‘The Requirement of a Clear and Plain Intention’ (n 41). Professor Bartlett argues that (at the 
very least) greater substance has been given to this notion by consistent adoption of a standard of 
‘inconsistency’ informed by it: at 126–7. 
52  See, eg, ibid; MA Stephenson, ‘The Doctrine of Extinguishment: And Then There Was Congoo’ 
(2016) 6(1) Property Law Review 3. For a broader analysis of the statutory interpretation issues at play, 
see Samantha Hepburn, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Native Title Extinguishment: Expanding 
Constructional Choices’ (2015) 38(2) UNSW Law Journal 587. 
53  Edgeworth (n 27) 28. Cf Brennan (n 6) 38. 
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extinguishment54 and make findings of effective ‘suspension’.55 As Sean Brennan notes, these 
cases at their core reflect a growing reluctance to find ‘inconsistency’ of the requisite type, and 
from this point on a high degree of ‘friction’ can occur without causing extinguishment.56 
 
III   THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AKIBA CORRECTION 
 
As implicitly acknowledged soon after by the High Court in Brown,57 the reasoning and 
outcome of the Akiba decision had broader implications – most obviously for the way in which 
native title rights and interests are to be defined. It also has acknowledged implications for the 
means by which rights are to be established (as alluded to earlier), and potentially for the 
viability of future ‘regional’ claims. Moreover, it is argued here that Akiba may hold a further 
inchoate significance – for communities with existing native title determinations and 
communities left behind by the strictures of the Yorta Yorta test for continuity and connection.    
The critical pivot for these broader implications is Akiba’s strong distinction between a ‘right’ 
and its ‘exercise’ – and an accompanying resistance to undue legal fragmentation of the rights 
(and connections with land). The underlying problem to be addressed is the Australian law’s 
penchant for detail in the examination and translation of traditional laws and customs, which 
as noted above has permeated many aspects of its operation. The Akiba distinction is potentially 
a big step on the path around the difficulties. Not least, there is scope here for a far better 
accommodation and rationalisation of community ‘change’. While the courts have long 
acknowledged the reality and/or legitimacy of change,58 attempts to find space for it within the 
stricter Australian methodology have been strained and faltering. These efforts have failed to 
develop into a principled and consistent flexibility. 
Interestingly, there is Canadian precedent for the Akiba distinction between ‘rights’ and their 
‘exercise’ – from the specific ‘Aboriginal rights’ jurisprudence commencing in the mid-1990s. 
McLachlin J in the critical case of R v Van der Peet,59 when considering an ‘aboriginal rights’ 
defence to a fisheries prosecution, had sought to avoid freezing rights (in part) by distinguishing 
                                       
54  Stephenson (n 52) 15. 
55  Edgeworth (n 27) 30–1; Stephenson (n 52) 21–2. Note in this regard however the apparent resistance of 
Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Congoo (2015) 256 CLR 239.  
56  Brennan (n 6) 41. Cf Stephenson (n 52) 16. 
57  Brown (2014) 253 CLR 507, 521 [34] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler, and Keane JJ). 
58  See, eg, Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 61, 70 (Brennan J), 109–10 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 192 (Toohey 
J); Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 131–3 [295]–[297], 137–8 [309] (Kirby J); Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 
CLR 422, 439–40 [31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 243–5 [569]–
[575] (Kirby J). For international examples, see Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 
1091 [132], 1103 [154] (Lamer CJ); R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507, 602 [179] (L’Heureux-Dubé 
J), 632 [240]–[241] (McLachlin J); R v Sappier [2006] 2 SCR 686, 713–15 [46]–[49] (Bastarache J); In 
re General Adjudication of all Rights to use Water in Big Horn River System, 753 P 2d 76, 119 
(Thomas J and Hanscum DJ) (Wyo, 1988); Faulkner v Tauranga District Council [1996] 1 NZLR 357, 
365–6 (Blanchard J); cf United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 
61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007) arts 3, 4, 21, 23, 26, 
31–2. 
59  [1996] 2 SCR 507. 
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between general ancestral rights and their modern exercise.60 Lamer CJ in delivering the 
majority judgment in the same case had himself noted that the activities under examination 
should be considered at a general rather than specific level, and may be the exercise in a 
‘modern’ form of a pre-contact practice, tradition or custom.61 The need for a broader definition 
of rights, to accommodate ‘the passage of time and changing conditions’, was also emphasised 
in important US cases from the related context of treaty fishing rights (subject to deliberate 
limitation in the treaty process).62 The logic of such an approach is compelling from the 
Australian perspective; a broader, more discerning definition of the underlying right can 
mitigate its fragility, and the complexity of its establishment, definition and operation in 
contemporary circumstances.63   
The distinction between a ‘right’ and its ‘exercise’ might prove to be elusive in some contexts, 
or as acknowledged in Akiba, sometimes inapposite.64 It might also (given the Australian 
history) be naturally resisted in complex lower court arguments and/or claim negotiations. 
Moreover, this was a deceptively simple turn in the Australian jurisprudence – against the tide 
of, at least, the preceding High Court cases. To shore up this reasoning, and indeed to better 
understand the reach of its implications, it is worthwhile to look back to the critical Australian 
context: the genesis and drivers of the problem Akiba was addressing; the alternatives offered 
up by earlier dissent; and the coherence and durability of this chosen solution.   
 
A   The Origins and Drivers of the Restrictive Australian Thinking 
 
The perennially popular passages of Mabo certainly laid out the tools for restrictive thinking – 
particularly in the persistent emphasis upon the source of native title in ‘traditional laws 
acknowledged’ and ‘traditional customs observed’.65 Yet, even putting aside the ambiguity of 
the key terms here, and the fact that they can be (and were in Mabo) used with varying intent 
and sometimes notable flexibility,66 the deeper detail of Mabo seems not to support a strict 
approach to either native title definition or proof of continuity and connection. It has been noted 
                                       
60  Ibid 630–3 [233]–[243], 635–6 [248]–[250] (McLachlin J), cf 590–2 [149]–[154] (L’Heureux-Dubè J) 
(both in dissent on the outcome).  
61  [1996] 2 SCR 507, 551–3 [51]–[54]. See also Mitchell v Minister of National Revenue [2001] 1 SCR 
911, 926–9 [9]–[15] (McLachlin CJ). Cf R v Sappier [2006] 2 SCR 686, 701–2 [23]–[24], 714–15 
[48]–[49] (Bastarache J). See also R v Powley [2003] 2 SCR 207.  
62  See, eg, United States v Michigan, 471 F Supp 192, 260; cf 280–1 (Fox CJ) (D Mich, 1979). Cf also 
United States v Washington, 384 F Supp 312, 401–2 (Boldt J) (WD Wash, 1974) and United States v 
Washington, 520 F 2d 676, 683 (Choy J) (9th Cir, 1978).   
63  See Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Federation Press, 
2008) 332, 434 n 41. See generally Part II of the book for more discussion including on the complex 
position in New Zealand. On the difficulties of definition, see also the references to formative 
Aboriginal rights case law and transnational commentary from authors such as Strelein, Myers, Barsh, 
Henderson, Morse, Rotman, Borrows, Boast, Ogden and Austin: at 434–5 n 42.   
64  (2013) 250 CLR 209, 224–5 [21] (French CJ and Crennan J).   
65  See especially Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 57–60, 70 (Brennan J). 
66  See, eg, Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 110 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). See also Graeme Neate, ‘Turning Back 
the Tide? Issues in the Legal Recognition of Continuity and Change in Traditional Law and Customs’ 
(Conference Paper, Native Title Conference 2002: Outcomes and Possibilities, 3 September 2002) 16–
22; Bruce Rigsby, ‘Custom and Tradition: Innovation and Invention’ (2006) 6 Macquarie Law Journal 
113. 
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many times in succeeding years,67 but is worth repeating, that the determination in Mabo was 
broadly phrased: an entitlement ‘as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and 
enjoyment of the lands’.68 The implication (at least) of a broad communal ‘ownership’ was 
also reflected in the apparent acknowledgment of that possibility in various other parts of the 
majority judgments.69 There were differences in those judgements as regards the precise 
conceptualisation of native title, but the baseline appeared to be that it was a ‘title to land’ 
rather than some ‘indeterminate’ and ‘contingent’ set of rights.70 Moreover, as regards proof 
of continuity and connection, there was little concern about conspicuous community 
adaptations,71 some express doubting of any specific continuity of ‘lifestyle’-type 
requirement,72 and notable flexibility on issues of continuity and connection even in Brennan 
J’s key pronouncements.73 
Beyond the inflections of the decision itself, the broader context for the Mabo case throws 
some light upon on its emphasis on ‘traditional laws and customs’. For example, the previous 
Australian and Privy Council precedent,74 and the Mabo Court’s principal task of extricating 
itself from that legal history, in various ways prompted attention to the specifics of the Meriam 
claimants’ ‘laws and customs’. Most notably, at the core of Brennan J’s judgment was a 
rejection of the ‘absence of law’ and ‘low in the scale of organisation’ theories of pre-settlement 
Australia.75 Moreover, the somewhat atypical nature of the Mabo claim (and its original 
framing) itself encouraged particularity – ie, a focus on the inter se rights within the Meriam 
community.76 With such context in mind the terminological emphasis of Mabo is more readily 
                                       
67  See, eg, for early examples Kent McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What’s the 
Connection?’ (1997) 36(1) Alberta Law Review 117, 141–2; Scott Grattan and Luke McNamara, ‘The 
Common Law Construct of Native Title: A “Re-feudalisation” of Australian Land Law’ (1999) 8(1) 
Griffith Law Review 50, 70. Cf Noel Pearson, ‘204 Years of Invisible Title: From the Most Vehement 
Denial of a People’s Rights to Land to a Most Cautious and Belated Recognition’ in MA Stephenson 
and Suri Ratnapala (eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution (University of Queensland Press, 1993) 75, 82. 
68  (1992) 175 CLR 1, 217 (The Court), see also 76 (Brennan J), cf 118–9 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 216 
(Toohey J). 
69  See, eg, ibid 51–2, 60–1 (Brennan J), 207, 214 (Toohey J), 88–9, 92–3 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
Implications to the contrary really only appear in comments of Toohey J: at 178–9, 184, 187–8, and the 
dissenting judge Dawson J: at 129, 132, 160, 169 – both of which were informed by Canadian 
decisions (see esp 186-9 (Toohey J), 132 (Dawson J)) that have since been corrected on the issue of 
‘Aboriginal Title’ content in Canada. 
70  Edgeworth (n 27) 28. 
71  See Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 60–1, 69 (Brennan J), 192 (Toohey J), 157 (Dawson J). 
72  See ibid 192 (Toohey J), 110 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
73  See ibid 57–61, 69–70 (Brennan J) – particularly the references to ‘practicability’, the adaptive nature 
of laws and customs, and survival of the ‘general nature’ of the connection.  
74  For examination of pertinent aspects of the pre-existing precedent (and the relevance of the pre-existing 
methodologies of statutory land rights and previous work on customary law by the Australian Law 
Reform Commission): see Young (n 63) ch 8. 
75  See, eg, Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 33, 37–45, 58 (Brennan J).   
76  See, eg, ibid 21–2, 24 (Brennan J), 115–8 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 156, 174 (Dawson J), 176 (Toohey 
J). Also, in Brennan J’s judgment the focus on traditional laws and customs acted as scaffolding for his 
(new) rationalisation of the inalienability of native title: at 51–70. For further recent analysis of the 
‘inalienability’ restriction, see David Yarrow, ‘The Inalienability of Native Title in Australia: A 
Conclusion in Search of a Rationale’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from Mabo to Akiba: A 
Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (The Federation Press, 2015) 60; Strelein, ‘The Right to 
Resources and the Right to Trade’ (n 18) 50. 
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understandable, and it is harder to view the decision as a deliberate precedent for the 
overzealousness to follow. 
Popular passages from Brennan J’s judgment in Mabo were, of course, entrenched in section 
223 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – complete with ambiguity but clipped of context.77 The 
statutory wording (in both sections 223 and 225) certainly ushered along the narrow Australian 
thinking, albeit perhaps not unavoidably.78 Yet ultimately section 223 took on a life of its own 
in perpetuating the restrictiveness, as the High Court strengthened its resolve that the statute 
must be the key point of reference in these cases.79 As will be seen, this approach, which 
Strelein has noted worked to separate negotiation and judicial reasoning ‘from the common 
law history and principles of justice’,80 proved to be very significant in the context of the issues 
under analysis here.  
In the succeeding years, the pursuit of detail was pressed forward by persistently selective 
quoting of Mabo (as endorsed by section 223). Moreover, further encouragement for ongoing 
emphasis on traditional laws and customs, and some exacting focus in the inquiry, came in 
various forms. There was further dalliance with the ‘absence of law’ and/or ‘scale of 
organisation’ debates,81 indicating that a clearer early rebuke would have been beneficial.82 
There was also (for various reasons) some continued blurring of communal and individual 
rights in these formative years83 – the latter tending to lean the analysis towards more specific 
inquiries. The courts also had regular encounters in the cases with the long statutory history of 
narrow and specific Aboriginal land use concessions.84 Indeed a number of the formative cases 
                                       
77  As noted (for example) in Northern Territory v Alyawarr (2005) 145 FCR 442, 468–9 [87] (Wilcox, 
French and Weinberg JJ). 
78  See, eg, Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402, especially [368], [382]–[383] (Sundberg J); 
Hal Wootten, ‘Mabo – Issues and Challenges’ (1994) 1 Judicial Review 303, 338; and generally Young 
(n 63) ch 10. As to the intended meaning and significance of s 225: see Lisa Strelein, ‘Reforming the 
Requirement of Proof: The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Native Title Inquiry’ (2014) 8(10) 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 6, 9 (‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’). 
79  See, eg, Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 35–40 [7]–[20] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 
110–19 [243]–[265] (Kirby J), 143 [324] (Callinan J); Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 60 [1]–[2], 62 [4], 64–
6 [14]–[16], 208–12 [468] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 
CLR 422, 432–3 [9], 439–40 [31]–[32], 451 [70], 453 [75], cf 442 [40], 453 [76] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ), cf 463 [112] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ), 489 [177] (Callinan J). 
80  Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’ (n 78) 6. See, eg, the comments in Commonwealth v 
Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171, 191 (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ); Noel Pearson, Up from the Mission: 
Selected Writings (Black Ink Books, 2009) 75–95 (‘Up from the Mission’).   
81  See Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 431–2 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (‘Native Title Act Case’); Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 182 (Gummow J), 
236 (Kirby J). 
82  As to the redundancy of the ‘scale’ methodology, see Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice?: Essays on 
Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2001) 
460–1. 
83  See, eg, Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, 115 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (‘Fejo’); Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 381–4 [67]–[75] (Gummow 
J). Cf Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 287 [665] (Callinan J). See also Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 
572, 583 (Kirby P); Dillon v Davies (1998) 8 Tas R 229, 235, 239–41 (Underwood J).   
84  See, eg, Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 141–2 (Dawson J); Native Title Act Case (1995) 183 CLR 373, 430–
1 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 119–20 
(Toohey J), 141 (Gaudron J), 217, 227, cf 246 (Kirby J); Fejo (1998) 195 CLR 96, 144 [88]–[89] 
(Kirby J) (discussing 1836 Letters Patent); Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 355 (GJ Gibson QC) (during 
argument), 363 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ), 408 (Callinan J); De Rose v South 
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(including Yanner in the High Court) concerned what might be termed ‘specific rights’-type 
native title claims (in defences to particular prosecutions etc).85 Such claims draw attention to 
more specific historical law, custom and practice for the definition of the right,86 and logically 
tended to produce similar particularity on questions of proof.87 Moreover, it should also be 
noted that the northern focus of early High Court appeals meant there was little opportunity for 
the Court to consider the many communities that might struggle with highly detailed 
inquiries.88 
Most importantly, however, the extinguishment focus in the early formative appeals89 
encouraged an emphasis on detail in various ways. The northerly claimants could, and did, 
emphasise the survival in fact of their laws, customs and lifestyle (often in some detail)90 as an 
aspect of their resistance to findings of legal extinguishment.91 And in some instances, faced 
with the prospect at that point of wholesale extinguishment, they understandably pressed some 
particularisation of the native title interest to highlight the possibility of some survival92 (or at 
least avoid too early a finding of extinguishment).93 For the High Court, rationalising past 
extinguishment was its first big dilemma after Mabo – and it chose to avoid indiscriminate 
blanket extinguishment via notions of coexistence and ‘partial extinguishment’.94 The latter 
                                       
Australia (2003) 133 FCR 325, 332–4 [14]–[25], 336–7 [34] (Wilcox, Sackville, and Merkel JJ) (‘De 
Rose’); Derschaw v Sutton (1996) 17 WAR 419, 433 (Wallwork J), 445 (Murray J); Wilkes v Johnsen 
(1999) 21 WAR 269, 274 (White J), 288, 293 (Wheeler J). See also the analysis in Australian Law 
Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (Report No 31, June 1986) ch 
35. 
85  This terminology borrows from the Canadian case law – see especially R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 
507 (discussed above). 
86  See, eg, Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 361–2 [4]–[5] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ), 381–
4 [64]–[75] (Gummow J), 402–4 [132]–[134] (Callinan J) (and note the reference to the early specific 
rights case of Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561); Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 574–5 
(Gleeson CJ), 584–5, 594–5 (Kirby P), 598, 601 (Priestley JA). Cf Derschaw v Sutton (1996) 17 WAR 
419, 425–7 (Franklyn J), 445 (Murray J); Dillon v Davies (1998) 8 Tas R 229, 234–5, 238–9 
(Underwood J).    
87  See, eg, Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 583–4 (Kirby P), 598, 601, 604 (Priestley JA). Cf 
Derschaw v Sutton (1996) 17 WAR 419, 425–7 (Franklyn J); Dillon v Davies (1998) 8 Tas R 229, 
234–5, 238–9 (Underwood J). 
88  See, eg, Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 604 (Priestley JA). 
89  See especially Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, and Fejo (1998) 195 CLR 96. 
90  See Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 4, 12 (during argument), 232 (Kirby J), cf 102 (Toohey J). See also Fejo 
(1998) 195 CLR 96, 98, 101–2 (AR Castan QC) (during argument). 
91  See Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 9, 11–13 (W Sofronoff QC) (during argument), 24 (SL Doyle SC) (during 
argument), 27–8 (JL Sher QC) (during argument), 60 (W Sofronoff QC) (in reply); Fejo (1998) 195 
CLR 96, 98 (J Basten QC) (during argument), 100–1 (AR Castan QC) (during argument), cf 113–14 (G 
Griffith QC) (during argument). Cf Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 358–9 (J Basten QC) (during 
argument). See also Noel Pearson, ‘The Concept of Native Title at Common Law’ in Galarrwuy 
Yunupingu (ed), Our Land is Our Life: Lands Rights – Past, Present and Future (University of 
Queensland Press, 1997) 150, 154 ff. 
92  See, eg, Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 17 (Sir M Byers QC) (during argument) comparing native title rights 
to profits à prendre; Fejo (1998) 195 CLR 96, 97–8 (J Basten QC) (during argument), 100–2 (AR 
Castan QC) (during argument), 108 (HC Burmester) (during argument), 152 (Kirby J). 
93  See, eg, Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 21 (SL Doyle SC) (during argument) emphasising that the nature and 
content of native title are determined by ‘particular facts’, cf 213 (Kirby J). See also Fejo (1998) 195 
CLR 96, 102–3 (RH Bartlett) (during argument) (particularly the emphasis for these purposes on the 
variability of native title).  
94  See generally Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1.   
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was, in the eyes of many, the major driver of the emerging conceptual fragmentation of native 
title. This played out immediately, even in process, as the High Court in Wik emphasised the 
factual particularity of native title to underscore its position that extinguishment could not be 
properly addressed in advance of a determination of native title below.95 
While the ‘survival in fact’ argument did not fare well,96 the argument for possible coexistence 
had to an extent been won (for better or worse via the concept of partial extinguishment). So 
for the claimants in Yanner, Commonwealth v Yarmirr (‘Yarmirr’),97 and Ward there was now 
more scope to argue broader conceptualisations of their interests – to resist too ready a finding 
of extinguishment or partial extinguishment, to press for a more comprehensive and possibly 
exclusive interest in competitive offshore areas, and/or to advance arguments to some mineral 
entitlement. Yet by the time of this shift in the legal landscape, ‘traditional laws and customs’ 
(with persistent overtones of specificity) had been woven deeply into the jurisprudence. In 
particular, the concept of partial extinguishment had by the time of Fejo v Northern Territory 
(‘Fejo’) brought clearly into play a potentially restrictive ‘bundle of rights’ thinking on 
content.98 And needless to say even when the claimants could press a more holistic view of 
their interests, ample encouragement for the strict thinking was still found in the arguments of 
government counsel – who were now pressing hard for piecemeal extinguishment and resisting 
commercially significant claims.99 The sophistry of the path that the law laid out for native title 
claimants in these formative years is regrettable. 
Driven haphazardly by these various features of the context, the restrictive thinking on native 
title content and proof did incrementally strengthen. As regards the content (or definition), the 
inclination to detail built particularly through the tenor and terminology of the key 
extinguishment cases – for example the emphasis upon the ‘usufructuary’, ‘sui generis’ and 
‘bundle of rights’ characterisations of the interest, its variability, and its ‘difference’ to common 
law interests. Occasionally there were (ostensibly) clearer restrictive comments,100 and more 
practically, detailed native title determinations were emerging from the lower courts. On the 
subject of proof of continuity/connection, again the momentum built through the tone of 
discussion (eg, persistent uncalibrated emphasis on the need for survival of ‘traditional laws 
                                       
95  See especially Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 122, 131, 133 (Toohey J), cf 213, 243, 249, 251 (Kirby J), cf 
also 126–7 (Toohey J), 169, 171 (Gummow J). 
96  Fejo (1998) 195 CLR 96. However, such arguments gained some traction with certain judges for 
certain purposes – see, eg, Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 233, 248, 250 (Kirby J).  
97  (2001) 208 CLR 1. 
98  (1998) 195 CLR 96. See also Lisa Strelein, ‘Conceptualising Native Title’ (2001) 23(1) Sydney Law 
Review 95. 
99  See, eg, Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 357 (RJ Meadows QC) (during argument). See also Ward (2002) 
213 CLR 1 (discussed below); Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 62(2). 
100  See, eg, Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 126 (Toohey J); Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 384 [75] (Gummow J). 
See also Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533, 576–7 (Olney J); Commonwealth v Yarmirr 
(1999) 101 FCR 171, 226 [223] (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ).   
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and customs’)101, occasional comments that were arguably more explicit,102 and some notably 
strict applications of the principles in lower courts.103    
 
B   Crystallisation in Ward and Yorta Yorta 
 
Whether carried by momentum or context (once again), or driven by interpretative preferences 
at the time or conscious legal choice, the High Court embraced the accidents of the Australian 
legal history in the 2002 decisions of Ward and Yorta Yorta. The Court rationalised, and further 
entrenched, the restrictive and highly focussed Australian approach to content and proof of 
continuity/connection. While these cases have already been much discussed, the essential 
reasoning is important in the context of this article. 
In Ward, the history explored above clearly weighed on the High Court’s treatment of a 
significant claim in the East Kimberley (on questions of content and extinguishment). The 
majority’s commitment to specificity in definition was in part directed to easing partial 
extinguishment (and accommodating loss of rights of control).104 Yet this reflected some 
neglect of the strong argument in this case for a more holistic conceptualisation of the native 
title interest – a conceptualisation that could itself provide resilience to the interest (and in fact 
warrant a new look at the whole concept of partial extinguishment).105 In any event, the shoring 
up of the strict approach to content came in various forms: a downplaying of the markers of 
control that might encourage a broader translation (eg, rights to be asked for permission and to 
‘speak for country’);106 a downplaying of earlier broad translations (ie, ‘the right to possess, 
occupy, use and enjoy land to the exclusion of others’);107 an emphasis on the specific phrase 
‘rights and interests’ in section 223 (and a correlative disregard of duties and obligations);108 
and a renewed emphasis upon the ‘difference’ of native title from general common law 
interests.109 From within this frame of reference, their Honours were critical of dalliances with 
                                       
101  See especially Fejo (1998) 195 CLR 96, 128 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne 
and Callinan JJ). 
102  Native Title Act Case (1995) 183 CLR 373, 452 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ) (later quoted by Brennan CJ in Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 92). See also Yarmirr (2001) 208 
CLR 1, 46–52 [37]–[50] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
103  Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (1999) 4(1) AILR 91; De Rose v South 
Australia [2002] FCA 1342. 
104  See, eg, Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 89 [76], 91 [82], 93–4 [91], 95 [95] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ), cf 243 [570] (Kirby J), 262 [615] (Callinan J). 
105  Ultimately the High Court confirmed the concept of ‘partial extinguishment’, particularly by reference 
to the terms of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth): ibid 89 [76], 208–12 [468] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ), cf 262 [615] (Callinan J). Contrast the views of Lee J and North J in the 
lower courts.  
106  Ibid 64–5 [14], 93 [90] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), cf 344–5 [821] (Callinan J). 
107  See especially ibid 93 [89], 95 [94] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).   
108  See especially ibid 64–5 [14] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See in this regard Finn, 
‘A Judge’s Reflections on Native Title’ (n 7) 27.   
109  See especially Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 64–5 [14], 91–2 [83]–[84], 93 [89]–[90], 95 [95] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).   
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notions of ‘ownership’110 and the lack of specificity111 in the lower courts – and unsurprisingly 
dismissed the possibility of mineral entitlements by reason (in part) of the lack of specific 
traditional law, custom or use relating to the minerals.112 
Recent commentary has continued to critique the ‘disaggregation’ of native title that was 
(nearly) perfected by Ward,113 and particularly the determined characterisation there of the 
interest as a bundle of rights – ‘as an imperative rather than as metaphor’.114 As a former 
president of the National Native Title Tribunal (Raelene Webb QC) has noted, this approach 
appeared to neglect the underlying holistic relationship with land that unifies and orders the 
specifically identifiable rights.115 Former Justice Finn, writing extra-judicially after the Akiba 
litigation, has similarly lamented the dilution of the proprietary conception of native title,116 
and emphasised that the reference to ‘rights and interests in relation to land or waters’ in the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) definition fails to capture the whole web of social rights and 
obligations in play.117 The Australian Law Reform Commission has recommended (post-
Akiba) at least a reworking of section 223 to confirm that native title may comprise more 
broadly-framed rights and possibly include a right to trade.118 However, there has been no 
statutory movement on these issues.  
The accompanying High Court decision in Yorta Yorta focused on questions of continuity and 
connection, confirming the threshold rejection of a significant southern claim on the basis of 
cessation in acknowledgment and observance of traditional laws and customs. Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ focused particularly on the ‘intersection’ of the traditional and 
common law systems at the point of acquisition of sovereignty,119 and emphasised that the 
former could not thereafter validly create rights, duties or interests (hence only those with 
origins in pre-sovereignty law and custom could be recognised).120 More tellingly, as regards 
proof of continuity and connection, their Honours went on to emphasise (with reference to 
section 223) that the ‘normative system’ (ie, traditional laws and customs) supporting the rights 
and interests must have had a ‘continuous existence and vitality’ since the point of sovereignty 
                                       
110  See ibid 91–2 [82]–[84] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), cf 267–8 [627] (Callinan J). 
111  See ibid 92 [86], 94–5 [93] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), see also 131 [195], 165–6 
[308]–[309], 176 [341], 198 [425], 204 [448] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
112  See ibid 185 [382], 186 [385], 207 [461], 208–12 [468] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ), cf 272 [637] ff (Callinan J). 
113  See, eg, Edgeworth (n 27) 28. 
114  Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’ (n 78) 9. 
115  Raelene Webb, ‘The Next Wicked Problem in Native Title: Managing Rights to Realise Their 
Potential’ (2016) 18 Southern Cross University Law Review 93, 101. 
116  Paul Finn, ‘Mabo into the Future’ (2012) 8(2) Indigenous Law Bulletin 5. 
117  Finn, ‘A Judge’s Reflections on Native Title’ (n 7) 27. 
118  Connection to Country Report (n 2) recommendation 8-1. 
119  Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, 439–40 [31], drawing on arguments and concepts particularly from 
Fejo (1998) 195 CLR 96, 128 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan 
JJ). And note, with respect to Fejo, Walker (n 17) 17–18. See also Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1.  
120  Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, 441–4 [37]–[44] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Their 
Honours considered that s 223(1) should be construed in this light and that the term ‘traditional’ not 
only refers to generational transmission but also conveys an age of the ‘traditions’ – only pre-
sovereignty normative rules are ‘traditional’: at 444 [46]. See also Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, 
454 [79], 456 [86] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 493 [191] (Callinan J). 
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for the rights and interests to subsist.121 They considered, correlatively, that the original 
‘society’ must have had a continuous survival.122 In various ways the court’s rationalisation 
(particularly when read with Ward) tended to shore up the particularity in the Australian 
continuity and connection inquiries. Through the emphasis on survival of ‘system’ and original 
‘society’, and the Court’s apparent interpretation of those concepts, the doorway was narrowing 
for many claimant communities.   
The reasoning in Yorta Yorta has proven particularly controversial – including by reason that 
it appears to both nullify and require the continued ‘vitality’ of the Aboriginal ‘system’, and 
adopt a quite constrained view of the newly interposed notion of ‘society’.123 Certainly this 
approach appeared to offer little room for principled accommodation, at the threshold, of the 
change and interruption found in many claimant group histories. It was suggested that ‘some’ 
change and adaptation in traditional law and custom or ‘some’ interruption in the enjoyment 
or exercise of rights and interests will ‘not necessarily be fatal’, yet the guidance offered 
seemed to just restate the question in the case of ‘change’ (‘what is ‘traditional?’) and add little 
in the case of interruption (has acknowledgement and observance continued ‘substantially 
uninterrupted’?).124 Former Chief Justice French, writing extra-judicially, prominently 
suggested a ‘reversal of onus’ – ie, that once certain basic facts had been established (including 
a reasonable belief of traditional connection) native title was presumed to exist subject to 
contrary proof.125 Other commentators have suggested the removal or clarification of the word 
‘traditional’ in the statute.126 The Australian Law Reform Commission itself recommended 
statutory reform, namely to include acknowledgment of the adaptive nature of traditional laws 
and customs and mitigate the various forms of continuity test drawn from Yorta Yorta.127 In 
the absence of legislative response, recent commentary has continued to emphasise that the 
Australian approach has produced ‘torturous and costly’ inquiry into authenticity and 
continuity – often exacerbated by state government guidelines.128  
The significant challenges left by Yorta Yorta, particularly for communities in the earlier settled 
and most impacted parts of Australia, in part prompted a rare exception to the history of 
                                       
121  Ibid 444–7 [47]–[55], 456 [87] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
122  See ibid 445–7 [49]–[55], 456–7 [87]–[89] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
123  For an overview of the early discussion and criticism, see Young (n 63) 324 ff (and the commentary 
discussed there). 
124  Yorta Yorta (2002) 214 CLR 422, 454–7 [78]–[89] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
125  See Justice Robert French, ‘Lifting the Burden of Native Title: Some Modest Proposals For 
Improvement’ (Speech, Federal Court Native Title User Group, 9 July 2008). Note that such a proposal 
was pursued in subsequent federal bills – although some commentators have rightly expressed concern 
that this idea relies somewhat on State behaviour rather than effecting any change to the requirements 
of proof themselves: see, eg, Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’(n 78) 7 (she notes that it 
may be strengthened by preventing a State from relying on its own wrongful acts to disprove continuity 
– referring to Justice AM North and Tim Goodwin, ‘Disconnection – the Gap between Law and Justice 
in Native Title: A Proposal for Reform, (Conference Paper, Annual Native Title Conference, 4 June 
2009)).   
126  See, eg, Pearson, Up from the Mission (n 80) 114, 124–5. For comment on such proposals, see Strelein, 
‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof (n 78) 8. 
127  Connection to Country Report (n 2), recommendations 5-1–5-4.  See also the proposals for guidance on 
the drawing of inferences in the proof of native title rights and interests (recommendation 7-1). 
128  See, eg, Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’ (n 78) 7–9. See also Finn, ‘A Judge’s 
Reflections on Native Title’ (n 7) 26–7; Paul Finn, ‘Mabo into the Future’ (2012) 8(2) Indigenous Law 
Bulletin 5, 6. 
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political inaction on these issues. The high threshold set by the Court, and the slow and costly 
claims progress in Victoria, led to the passage of the Traditional Owner Settlement Act 2010 
(Vic).129 This scheme deliberately eases continuity and connection requirements by turning 
more focus to contemporary connections.130 There are lingering concerns with some aspects of 
the process (and substance)131 of the scheme, but it is offering a more supported, 
comprehensive and efficient path for communities.132 Importantly for present purposes, as 
Strelein has noted, the Victorian scheme reminds us that when the general formal processes are 
unable to properly engage with land justice claims, they do not simply go away.133  
 
IV   AKIBA’S PROSPECTIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTENT 
 
The recognition of commercial resource rights in Akiba was highly significant in the context 
of this Australian history; not surprisingly there had been early defeats on such claims and 
subsequent avoidance of the issue in applications and determinations.134 This aspect of the case 
(and its take up in lower courts) has received considerable attention in the recent 
commentary.135 Hewitt had traced the relevant history in an article written prior to the Akiba 
appeals, noting the array of obstacles faced in claims to commercial rights.136 These included 
(in addition to the possibility of past regulatory extinguishment) an initial resistance even to 
the idea that a ‘right to trade’ could be a ‘right or interest in respect of land or waters’;137 a 
view held (for a time) that an entitlement to exclusivity would be required before commercial 
rights could be recognised;138 and at the very least a likely insistence on specific evidence of 
                                       
129  Bryan Keon-Cohen, ‘From Euphoria to Extinguishment to Co-existence?’ (2017) 23 James Cook 
University Law Review 9, 20–1.   
130  See generally ibid 21. 
131  See, eg, Katie O’Bryan, ‘More Aqua Nullius? The Traditional Owner Settlement Act 2010 (Vic) and 
the Neglect of Indigenous Rights to Manage Inland Water Resources’ (2016) 40 Melbourne University 
Law Review 547.  
132  See generally Keon-Cohen (n 129) 23–4; Toni Bauman et al, ‘Traditional Owner Agreement-Making 
in Victoria: The Right People for Country Program’ (2014/2015) 18(1) Australian Indigenous Law 
Review 78. 
133  Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’ (n 78) 9. 
134  See Patrick McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu: Commercial Native Title Rights after Akiba’ (2015/2016) 
19(2) Australian Indigenous Law Review 64, 64–5 (‘Pilki and Birriliburu’). For a discussion of a rare 
trial finding of trading rights see the discussion of the Alyawarr litigation (overturned on appeal): at 
64–5. For discussion of rare examples (and some ambiguity on this point) in earlier consent 
determinations, see Strelein, ‘The Right to Resources and the Right to Trade’ (n 18) 50. 
135  See, eg, Lauren Butterly, ‘Unfinished Business in the Straits: Akiba v Commonwealth of Australia 
[2013] HCA 33’ (2013) 8(8) Indigenous Law Bulletin 3; McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 134); 
Gabrielle Lauder and Lisa Strelein, ‘Native Title and Commercial Fisheries: The Torres Strait Sea 
Claim’ (2013) 118 Precedent 13; Edgeworth (n 27). See generally Brennan et al (eds) (n 2).   
136  Anne Hewitt, ‘Commercial Exploitation of Native Title Rights: A Possible Tool in the Quest for 
Substantive Equality for Indigenous Australians?’ (2011) 32 Adelaide Law Review 227. See also 
Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v Northern Territory (2016) 255 FCR 228, 242 [80] ff 
(Mansfield J). 
137  See, eg, Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533. 
138  See, eg, Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171. For a discussion of this thinking and its 
development (and its lingering presence in argument but ultimate rejection in the Akiba litigation 
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relevant pre-sovereignty activity and a reluctance to translate139 evidence of pre-sovereignty 
exchange into commercial and trading rights.140 
 
A Earlier Judicial Opposition to the Constraints 
 
The final obstacles noted above141 reflected, of course, the deeper-set problems in the 
Australian law. And it is important to recall at this juncture that the Akiba correction emerges 
from a more complex history of judicial disquiet. On the issue of content there have long been 
glimpses of broader thinking. In the first place, the ‘right/exercise’ distinction was not entirely 
without support in the formative Australian precedent. Most visibly, in Yarmirr Kirby J had 
emphasised that the ‘present content’ of native title may reflect a ‘modern’ form of exercise of 
traditional laws and customs.142 Less directly (for example), Gummow J in Yanner had noted 
that ‘[t]he exercise of the native title right to hunt was a matter within the control of the 
appellant’s indigenous community’.143 Interestingly however, most references to a 
‘right/exercise’ distinction came in the context of proof (returned to below). 
Signs of a broader conceptualisation of the interest had come in other forms also, most 
conspicuously in lower court judgements from Ward.144 Alongside this, there had been 
cogitation on the possibility of post-sovereignty accrual of interests,145 and various examples 
of emphasis on the need for rights to be ‘adaptable’. Most conspicuously, Kirby J began to 
assemble in Yarmirr a concerted opposition to the strict thinking – emphasising the economic 
side of Indigenous land use, the fragility of specifically-defined rights, the inevitability of 
cultural adaptation, and the injustice of historicising the Aboriginal interest (at least where 
original exclusivity is established).146 By the time of Ward, Kirby J’s thinking had firmed. His 
Honour stressed that the object of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) was ‘the recognition of 
“native title”, rather than the provision of a list of activities permitted on, or in relation to, areas 
                                       
(especially (2010) 204 FCR 1, [751]–[752])), see Strelein, ‘The Right to Resources and the Right to 
Trade’ (n 18) 52; Brennan (n 6) 34–5.   
139  See, eg, Northern Territory v Alyawarr (2005) 145 FCR 442, 487–8 [156]–[157] (Wilcox, French and 
Weinberg JJ). 
140  Hewitt (n 136) 242 ff. Not surprisingly the trend became to explicitly exclude commercial rights from 
applications and determinations (contested or consent): McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birrililburu’ (n 134) 65.   
141  See also the discussion in McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birrililburu’ (n 134) and the examples cited there.   
142  Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 137–8 [309], citing, inter alia, Mabo (1992) 175 CLR 1, 70 (Brennan J), 
110 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 192 (Toohey J).   
143  (1999) 201 CLR 351, 397 [115] (in the context of a consideration of the effect of regulation of that 
control). 
144  See Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483, 505 ff (Lee J); Western Australia v Ward (2000) 
99 FCR 316, 346, 372–4 (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ), 515, 526 ff (North J). Other notable glimpses 
in the formative jurisprudence include: Native Title Act Case (1995) 183 CLR 373, 450 (Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Yanner (1999) 201 CLR 351, 372–3 [37]–[40] 
(Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Wik (1996) 187 CLR 1, 126–7 (Toohey J), 169 
(Gummow J).  
145  See, eg, Commonwealth v Yarmirr (1999) 101 FCR 171, 180–235 (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ). 
146  Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 118–9 [264], 131–4 [295]–[300], 142 [320] (Kirby J). 
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of land or waters’.147 Building upon the dissent of North J in the Full Federal Court below,148 
Kirby J emphasised the need for the law to accommodate change and development in 
traditional laws and customs, and recognise the possibility of ‘new aspects’ of traditional rights 
and interests developing. And he considered, on the basis of principles of equality, that where 
a community’s native title is established as conferring possession, occupation, use and 
enjoyment of the land and waters to the exclusion of others, there must be a presumption that 
such right carries with it the use and enjoyment of minerals and like resources (without separate 
inquiry regarding the identity of those resources).149 
After Ward, while some of the succeeding lower court cases embraced the strict thinking,150 
others continued to search for breadth even within the somewhat crystallised restrictions then 
in place. Efforts included ongoing attempts to accommodate rights/interests significantly 
affected by or arising from change or adaptation in laws and customs,151 and broader 
conceptualisations of (at least) the original interest.152    
The prominent reference by Kirby J (above) to the presumptions attending ‘exclusivity’ is 
significant. It connects to a deep vein of logic found consistently in the comparative 
jurisprudence. This logic is most accessible in the 1997 Canadian decision of Delgamuukw v 
British Columbia where Lamer CJ confirmed that ‘aboriginal title’, established essentially 
upon proof of exclusive occupation at the acquisition of sovereignty (by reference to physical 
occupation and systems of Aboriginal law),153 confers a right to the land itself (and its use for 
a variety of purposes).154 However, the essential reasoning here has a longer pedigree. To cite 
just one further significant example, in a 1954 US Court of Claims decision it was stated:155 
 
The Government … denies that [the Tee-Hit-Ton], as a group or clan, owned anything. It says 
that even if they exploited certain lands for the purpose of taking fish or game or berries or 
roots from them, that was not ownership. We think that an entity, such as an individual, or a 
tribe or clan of Indians, which exploits land under a claim of right, to the exclusion of others, 
and takes from the land what is of interest to it, though what interests it might not interest others 
of a different culture, is asserting ‘ownership’ of that land.   
 
                                       
147  (2002) 213 CLR 1, 243 [570]. 
148  Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316. 
149  Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, [569]–[575]. 
150  See especially Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666. Compare also the comments in Sampi v 
Western Australia [2005] FCA 777, especially 4–5 [10], 14 [42], 14–17 [44], 300 [1054], 304–6 
[1069]–[1073] (French J); Rubibi Community v Western Australia [No 6] (2006) 226 ALR 676, 703–4 
[118]–[119] (Merkel J); Rubibi Community v Western Australia [No 7] [2006] FCA 459, 3–4 [8]–[12] 
(Merkel J); Western Australia v Sebastian (2008) 173 FCR 1. Cf Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 
141 FCR 457, especially 493–7 [122]–[142], 529–30 [275] (Selway J).   
151  See, eg, Rubibi Community v Western Australia [No 5] [2005] FCA 1025, 96 [266] (Merkel J); Warrie 
(formerly TJ) v Western Australia (2017) 365 ALR 624, 663–8 [126]–[148] (Rares J) (‘Warrie’). 
152  See, eg, Lardil Peoples v Queensland [2004] FCA 298; Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 
1402.    
153  [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 1095–7 [140]–[143] (Lamer CJ for Lamer CJ, Cory and Major JJ, McLachlin J  
concurring at 1135 [209]). 
154  Subject only to the limitation that uses must not be ‘irreconcilable’ with the nature of the attachment to 
the land: ibid 1083 [117]. 
155  Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 120 F Supp 202, 204 (Alaska, 1954) (Madden J) – implicitly 
approved in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272, 275, 285 (1955). 
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This thinking has now seeped some way into Australian approach to subsisting exclusive native 
title interests (see below), albeit having to work around the implications of Ward to do so.156 
Yet it was long missing in the Australian law, largely owing it seems to the prevalence of partial 
extinguishment (particularly of any rights of control) and an unspoken commitment to what 
might be termed a ‘piñata’ approach157 to the effect of that partial extinguishment – namely 
that the subsisting rights necessarily tumbled out in very specifically-defined fragments of the 
former interest.158 The logic of this has been under-examined.159 Where there has been partial 
extinguishment, and even a technical loss of ‘control’, it is difficult to see why the original 
comprehensive and exclusive nature of the relationship should not inform the definition of the 
residual interest. And why should the occasional survival of ‘exclusivity’ or passing 
interferences to defeat it (each sometimes just an accident of the legal history) produce so great 
a difference in approach to the contemporary interest? The people and their custodianship 
remain, in either case, and it might seem that their interests should be respected to the limit of 
actual, necessary inconsistency (as per recent High Court direction). It is not surprising that 
Kirby J’s clear dissenting voice emerged in Yarmirr, and that the recent breakthrough came in 
Akiba, as the loss of control or ‘exclusivity’ in those scenarios emerged not from inconsistent 
grants, but from more amorphous common law rights of public and international use. In that 
context, the ‘piñata’ logic looks particularly weak. 
 
It might seem that the Akiba correction taps a wholly different vein of logic to that which Kirby 
J was exploring, as on its surface it just adopts a broader conceptualisation of a specific right 
(rather than the logic of ‘ownership’). However, while this is a more measured response it does 
stem from a similar logic. Both approaches, at their core, draw from a greater respect for the 
dominion inherent in original Indigenous custodianship of lands and waters. The Akiba search 
for the ‘underlying right’ necessarily steers the inquiry back towards the original (most likely 
comprehensive and exclusive) interest. In a sense then the threads of the broader Australian 
thinking are converging on a more principled approach. The piñata thinking lies at the heart of 
the remaining difficulty, but Akiba has given us a way to begin re-aggregating the broken 
pieces. They can now be, at the very least, bigger pieces.160      
 
B The Impact of Akiba So Far 
 
                                       
156  See also the discussions in Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’ (n 78) 9; Strelein, ‘The 
Right to Resources and the Right to Trade’ (n 18) 48–9. But see, eg, Western Australia v Willis (2015) 
239 FCR 175, 220–39 [115]–[218] (Barker J), cf 188 [37] (Dowsett J) (‘Pilki Appeal’). 
157  See Young (n 63) 435.  
158  See, eg, Lardil Peoples v Queensland [2004] FCA 298, [164]–[197] (Cooper J); Neowarra v Western 
Australia [2003] FCA 1402, [471]–[522], [771]–[783] (Sundberg J). 
159  For some brief contemplation of alternative approaches: see, eg, Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 
141 FCR 457, 521–2 [235]–[240]. Cf the view of Kirby J in Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 119–20 [268]–
[269], 125–6 [280]–[282], 136–7 [305]–[307]. See also the comments on this point in works by 
Strelein: Strelein, Compromised Jurisprudence (n 16) 124–5; Lisa Strelein, ‘From Mabo to Yorta 
Yorta: Native Title Law in Australia’ (2005) 19 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 225, 
266–7 (particularly the author’s reference to an ‘exclusive possession-minus’ methodology); and more 
recently Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’ (n 78) 9 (and note the point made there that 
the wording of s 225 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) encourages this thinking).  
160  It might be added here that the clear rejection in Akiba of the idea that the existence of commercial 
rights would depend upon the survival of ‘exclusivity’ (see especially Akiba v Queensland [No 3] 
(2010) 204 FCR 1, 187 [751]–[752] (Finn J)) signals a growing discontent with ‘piñata’ thinking more 
generally. 
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There was some risk that the Akiba reasoning might not reach far beyond its own facts. The 
offshore claims are somewhat unique both in terms of how exclusivity has been defeated (as 
noted above) and the focussing of competitive activity on particular finite resources. Moreover, 
the laws and customs evidence in Akiba highlighted utility and practicality in a manner not 
often seen in a jurisprudence built on tradition and spirituality.161 Perhaps most importantly, 
there was strong evidence of historical and modern trading in Akiba162 that might prove hard 
to replicate.163 Yet the Akiba correction – through its simplicity, moderacy and timing – has 
produced significant progress on questions of content in the lower courts. 
 
There was inevitably some lag as the courts dealt with claims that had been argued (or at least 
framed) before Akiba, and consent determinations continued to exclude commercial rights as 
per the long practice.164 Yet prospectively the legal landscape had changed; there was 
significant encouragement (on the Akiba logic) to claim rights in broader terms – even if only 
in an attempt to avoid extinguishment by specific interferences.165 This reveals that parties’ 
strategies are now truly an inversion of those in the early years (discussed above), and that the 
arguments for broader interests put forward particularly in Ward were perhaps simply ahead of 
their time.     
 
The 2014 decisions in Willis v Western Australia (‘Pilki’),166 and BP (dec’d) v Western 
Australia (‘Birriliburu’)167 have been described as the ‘first fruit’ of the long search for 
commercial native title land use rights in Australia.168 In both (short) cases North J upheld 
broadly worded claims to access and take resources for any purpose169 (and a 2015 appeal from 
Pilki was unanimously dismissed).170 North J (following comments in Akiba)171 rejected the 
state government’s complaints of ‘lack of precision’ in the broadly-cast rights, where 
established by the evidence.172 Dowsett and Jagot JJ in the Pilki appeal similarly declined to 
draw distinctions as to purpose of use where the evidence did not show any such distinction in 
traditional laws and customs.173   
 
In the 2016 decision of Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v Northern Territory, the 
government parties again challenged a broadly phrased ‘right to access and take for any 
                                       
161  Finn, ‘A Judge’s Reflections on Native Title’ (n 7) 27. See also Lauder and Strelein (n 135). 
162  See Akiba v Queensland [No 3] (2010) 204 FCR 1, 134 [526] (Finn J). 
163  See McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 134) 66; see also Brennan (n 6) 34 ff.  
164  See McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 134) 68. 
165  Ibid 67. See also Patrick McCabe, ‘Commercial Native Title Rights in 2018: A Belated New Dawn’ 
AUSPUBLAW (Blog Post, 20 February 2019) <https://auspublaw.org/2019/02/commercial-native-
title-rights-in-2018/> (‘Commercial Native Title Rights in 2018’). 
166  [2014] FCA 714. See also Willis v Western Australia [No 2] [2014] FCA 1293.  
167  [2014] FCA 715. 
168  McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 134) 64–5.   
169  See especially Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [115] ff (North J); Birriliburu [2014] FCA 715, [86] ff (Jagot J) 
170  Pilki Appeal (2015) 239 FCR 175.     
171  Akiba (2013) 250 CLR 209, 241–2 [65]–[68] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
172  Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [128] (North J). The exclusive nature of the native title determination in issue in 
Pilki was not a significant focus for North J, and he dismissed the State’s concern that he was relying 
on ‘ownership’ assumptions (contrary to Ward) – on the basis that there was evidence here of 
underpinning traditional laws and customs: Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [134] (North J). See also Birriliburu 
[2014] FCA 715, [97], [103] (North J). 
173  Pilki Appeal (2015) 239 FCR 175, 188–9 [37]–[39] (Dowsett J), 219 [112]–[113] (Jagot J) (albeit with 
some comments from Dowsett J about the unchallenged ‘vagueness’ of the claimant evidence). 
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purpose the resources of the area’ (in the context of both exclusive and non-exclusive native 
title).174 Relying on the reasoning in the Pilki Appeal, it was argued that at least if there was a 
distinction as to purposes in the relevant traditional law and custom, that would justify 
contemporary definition by purpose – as would other traditional constraints on use that directly 
or indirectly contradicted commercial purposes.175 Mansfield J carefully traced the relevant 
jurisprudential history,176 and evidence, and ultimately rejected the contended confinement of 
the right to personal or communal purposes of a domestic or subsistence nature, as there was 
no basis for that in the claimant or expert evidence.177 His Honour also considered that 
customary constraints on use related to ‘exercise’ (not detracting from the rights 
themselves),178 and expressly declined to limit the right in issue to resources historically 
used.179 In another 2016 decision, Narrier v Western Australia (‘Narrier’),180 Mortimer J relied 
on key reasoning in the Pilki Appeal in similarly holding that the claim group had made out a 
‘right to access and take resources for any purpose, including commercial purposes’ (in a 
finding of exclusive native title).181 
 
In the initial cases North J had dismissed the ‘large number’ of earlier more limited consent 
determinations (as possibly reflecting negotiated compromise), and earlier more limited 
contested determinations (as reflecting different claims or different evidence).182 Yet such 
reasoning just serves to underline the significance of Akiba, and the scale of the shift in the 
contemporary legal context. McCabe has traced the slow but clear emergence of the Akiba-
type claim through the succeeding years.183 In 2016, beyond the three contested successes 
already noted above184 there were no apparent inroads into consent determinations. In 2017 
there were numerous consent determinations in the old style, and finally one including an Akiba 
right.185 However, in 2018 there were several determinations of Akiba rights (mostly by 
consent) – albeit with a larger number of consent determinations still following old formats 
(see further below).     
 
C   Accompanying Developments 
 
                                       
174  (2016) 255 FCR 228, 232 [10] (Mansfield J). See also Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v  
Northern Territory [No 2] [2016] FCA 908. 
175  Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v Northern Territory (2016) 255 FCR 228, 241 [76] (Mansfield 
J). 
176  Ibid 242 [80] ff. 
177  This and other findings were included in the Australian Law Reports: Isaac (Rrumburriya Borroloola 
Claim Group) v Northern Territory (2016) 339 ALR 98, 160 [364].   
178  Ibid 160 [363]. 
179  Ibid 157 [348] ff. 
180  [2016] FCA 1519. 
181  See especially ibid [32], [883]–[913]. Cf Murray [2016] FCA 752, [48], [643]–[699] (McKerracher J). 
Contrast, however, Croft (Barngarla Native Title Claim Group) v South Australia (2015) 325 ALR 
213, 251 [198] ff, 339 [731] ff (Mansfield J). 
182  See especially Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [129]–[130]. See also Birriliburu [2014] FCA 715, [98]–[99] 
(North J); Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v Northern Territory (2016) 255 FCR 228, 243 [84] 
ff (Mansfield J).  
183  McCabe, ‘Commercial Native Title Rights in 2018’ (n 165). 
184  Murray [2016] FCA 752; Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v Northern Territory (2016) 255 FCR 
228; Narrier [2016] FCA 1519.   
185  See Atkins v Western Australia [2017] FCA 1465. 
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There have been some significant complementary developments. The notion of ‘exclusivity’ – 
which as explained above is critical in the comparative jurisprudence and in the more strident 
Australian dissents – has been evolving in the Australian cases. In the first place, as Bartlett 
has carefully explored, there has been an incremental lowering of the notional bar for its 
survival.186 Most importantly, in Banjima People v Western Australia187 the Full Federal Court 
emphasised the centrality in this regard of shared Indigenous acknowledgement of permission 
and control rules under traditional laws and customs (and accompanying spiritual or other 
sanctions) – rather than acts of physical barring or eviction.188 More recently, in Warrie 
(formerly TJ) v Western Australia189 the court similarly emphasised the vitality of belief in 
requirements of permission and spiritual sanctions (despite adaptations) as evidence of ongoing 
traditional laws and customs signifying ‘control’,190 and downplayed the significance of 
interference by non-Aboriginal people.191   
 
The question of whether findings of surviving exclusivity have been properly respected and 
translated, in contemporary determinations, is returned to below. At this point, it is important 
to note that at least the establishment of this critical feature of a claim (providing the perimeter 
protection of the fabled ‘right against the whole world’) 192 can be approached in a responsive 
manner.193 Moreover, it may well be, given the tenor of recent High Court extinguishment 
cases, that we must soon reconsider the legal fragility of such exclusivity. There is now an 
argument that findings about past extinguishment of the right ‘to speak for country’, or to make 
decisions about access and use, will need to be carefully considered in light of the strengthening 
preference for mere suppression.194 Importantly, in addition to implications for usage rights 
(explored above), the right to exclusivity helps to protect a community’s right not to develop 
or commercialise. The prospect that exclusivity is now more obtainable and potentially more 
sustainable highlights again that the threads of the Australian law are converging on a more 
principled native title doctrine.     
 
The other important development in the context of native title content, coming in the wake of 
Akiba, has been the belated emergence in the Griffiths litigation of a compensation 
methodology in relation to contemporary (compensable) extinguishment. The economic loss 
component of the compensation order there (for the itemised non-exclusive and non-
commercial rights in issue)195 dropped through the course of the appeals – from 80% to 65% 
                                       
186  See Richard Bartlett, ‘Native Title Rights to Exclusive Possession, Use and Enjoyment and the 
Yinjibarndi’ (2018) 43(1) University of Western Australia Law Review 92 (‘Native Title Rights to 
Exclusive Possession’), and note the older cases cited there.     
187  (2015) 231 FCR 456. 
188  Ibid 467 [23], 470–4 [33]–[44] (The Court). See also Narrier [2016] FCA 1519, [871] ff. 
189  (2017) 365 ALR 624. 
190  Ibid 644 [44], 663 [126], 666 [141], 668 [149]–[151], 722 [381] (Rares J).   
191  Ibid 659 [106] ff, 666 [141] ff. See Bartlett, ‘Native Title Rights to Exclusive Possession’ (n 186) 106.  
192  Bartlett, ‘Native Title Rights to Exclusive Possession’ (n 186) 105. See also Northern Territory v 
Griffiths (dec’d) (2019) 364 ALR 208, 229 [69] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ) 
(‘Griffiths’). 
193  As to the growing prevalence of ‘exclusive’ determinations, see Belinda Burbidge, ‘Native Title 
Snapshot 2018’ [2018] (2) Native Title Newsletter 10–11 (note however the disproportionate 
accumulation in Western Australia). 
194  See Brennan (n 6) 42. 
195  See Griffiths (2019) 364 ALR 208, 214 [10], cf 229 [69]–[70], 240 [106] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, 
Nettle and Gordon JJ). This key joint judgment is the focus here. 
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to 50% of freehold equivalent value.196 In this respect the High Court did ultimately refocus 
some attention on the spiritual side of the native title interest197 (a substantial award for non-
economic loss was upheld in the appeals).198 So while the total figures involved ensure that 
there will be renewed effort in negotiations across the country,199 perhaps some gloss came off 
the possibility that this litigation might a catalyst for better acknowledgment and realisation of 
the economic potential of native title.200 However, the clear postulation in economic loss 
calculations of a freehold equivalent valuation for an exclusive interest (from which deductions 
were to be made here),201 and the robust conclusions on non-economic loss,202 reflect and 
support the broader understanding of the nature and depth of the native title interest.203 
Moreover, Griffiths underscores the importance of properly exploring the Akiba thinking and 
its implications204 – to prevent artificial and jurisprudentially accidental confinements of native 
title being enshrined in compensation awards.  
 
The compensation litigation also has a more subtle relevance to the arguments here. As 
McGrath has noted, expert evidence in native title has to this point been largely directed to 
questions about the survival and surviving nature of the interest – namely whether and how it 
has endured colonisation. Griffiths signals a shift. Experts must now turn their minds to the 
‘shadow side of survival’ – loss – and fully articulate the qualities and consequences of the 
impacts that accompany the loss of rights and connection.205 This is a potentially significant 
turn in a legal history that has been only narrowly and selfishly interested in ‘impact’. Abstract 
questions of legal extinguishment tended to steer the doctrine in the critical formative years, 
which contributed to the doctrinal problems that are only now being untangled.206 It seems very 
likely that this new, belated focus on what has in fact been ‘lost’ can only help to build a truer 
understanding of the comprehensive nature of First Peoples’ relationships with land. It was, 
perhaps, a significant missing ingredient in the courts’ earlier grappling with these important 
legal, social and economic questions.       
     
                                       
196  Ibid 240 [106]. See (earlier) Northern Territory v Griffiths (2017) 256 FCR 478; and Griffiths v 
Northern Territory [No 3] (2016) 337 ALR 362. 
197  See Griffiths (2019) 364 ALR 208, 255 [153] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ), quoting 
key passages from Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 64–5 [14] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ).  
198  Griffiths (2019) 364 ALR 208, 273 [237] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
199  See, eg, Pearson v South Australia (Tjayuwara Unmuru Native Title Compensation Claim) [2017] FCA 
1561. 
200  See, eg, Webb, ‘2016 Sir Frank Kitto Lecture’ (n 28) 123; Keon-Cohen (n 129) 15 ff. 
201  See especially Griffiths (2019) 364 ALR 208, 212 [2], 229 [70], 230 [74], cf 226–7 [62]–[64] (Kiefel 
CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). As to the relevance of inalienability, see generally Griffiths 
(2019) 364 ALR 208, 238 [99] ff (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
202  Ibid 255 [152] ff (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
203  See also ibid 237 [96] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ) (reference to the ‘rights’ v 
‘exercise’ distinction); ‘[T]he value of the native title rights and interests is not ordinarily to be 
confined to the benefit of their past uses but should be extended to their highest and best use’: at 237 
[97] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
204  See in this regard ibid 230 [74], 234 [87], 240 [106] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
205  Pamela Faye McGrath, ‘Native Title Anthropology after the Timber Creek Decision’ (2017) 6(5) Land, 
Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title 1. See also Griffiths (2019) 364 ALR 208, 223 [46], 255 [154], 256 
[159] ff, [166] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ. 
206  See above Parts II and III(A). 
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V IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING DETERMINATIONS 
 
As noted at the outset, a looming problem now is the awkward shadow that the Akiba 
conceptual advances cast on many past determinations. As a result of the legal history explored 
earlier, and government interpretations of it,207 limitations have been built into many of those 
determinations (both contested and consent). And the analysis above indicates that the old 
thinking will linger for a time in new ones. 
 
A close survey of the qualifications found in recent (ultimately) consent determinations208 
illustrates some post-Akiba expansion of thinking – but also (very clearly) the consistency and 
tenacity of the past trends and the nature of the potential pre-Akiba ‘deficit’ we are left with. 
These determinations regularly feature: 
• detailed itemisation of permissible activities in non-exclusive determinations;209  
                                       
207  Strelein, ‘Reforming the Requirement of Proof’ (n 78) 9. 
208  From January 2018 to mid-March 2019 – the relevant determinations (in chronological order) being: 
Forrest (Ngurrara People) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 289 (‘Forrest’); Agius v South Australia 
[2018] FCA 358 (‘Agius’); Croft (Barngarla Native Title Claim Group) v South Australia [No 3] 
[2018] FCA 552 (‘Croft’); Lightning (Nywaigi People) v Queensland [2018] FCA 493 (‘Lightning’); 
Hamlett (Wajarri Yamatji People) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 545 (‘Hamlett’); Doolan (Andado, 
Pmere Ulperre, New Crown and Therreyererte Family Groups) v Northern Territory [2018] FCA 709 
(‘Doolan’); Finlay (Kuruma Marthudunera Peoples) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 548 (‘Finlay’); 
Manado (Bindunbur Native Title Claim Group) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 854 (‘Manado 1’) 
(but see appeal Manado (Bindunbur Native Title Claim Group) v Western Australia [2018] FCAFC 
238); Jack (Imarnt, Titjikala and Idracowra Estates) v Northern Territory [2018] FCA 708 (‘Jack’); 
Glenn (Alherramp, Arempey, Lyelyepwenty, Ngwenyenp and Tywerl Landholding Groups) v Northern 
Territory [2018] FCA 889 (‘Glenn’); Breadon (Inteyere, Twenge, Ipmengkere, Murtikutjara, Aniltika 
and Nthareye Landholding Groups) v Northern Territory [2018] FCA 890 (‘Breadon’); Western 
Bundjalung People v A-G (NSW) [2018] FCA 970 (‘Torrens’); Holborow (Yaburara & Mardudhunera 
People) v Western Australia [No 3] [2018] FCA 1108 (‘Holborow’); Muriata (Girramay People #2) v 
Queensland [2018] FCA 1120 (‘Muriata’); Muir (Manta Rirrtinya People) v Western Australia [2018] 
FCA 1388 (‘Muir’); Wiggan (Mayala People) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 1485 (‘Wiggan’); Tex 
(Lappi Lappi and Ngulupi Claim Group) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 1591 (‘Tex’); Wavehill 
(Wubalawun Group) v Northern Territory [2018] FCA 1602 (‘Wavehill’); Margarula (Mirarr People) 
v Northern Territory [2018] FCA 1670 (‘Margarula’); Drury (Nanda People) v Western Australia 
[2018] FCA 1849 (‘Drury’); Oxenham (Malgana People) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 1929 
(‘Oxenham’); Sturt (Jaru Native Title Claim) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 1923 (‘Sturt’); Egan 
(Wajarri Yamatji People) (Part C) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 1945 (‘Egan’); Gordon (Kariyarra 
Native Title Claim Group) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 1990 (‘Gordon’); Coulthard v South 
Australia [2018] FCA 1993 (‘Coulthard’); Street (Giniyjawarrni Yoowaniya Riwi Native Title Claim 
Group) v Western Australia [2018] FCA 2019 (‘Street’); Jessell (Goorring Native Title Claimants) v 
Western Australia [2018] FCA 2047 (‘Jessell’); Smirke (Jurruru People) v Western Australia [2018] 
FCA 2079 (‘Smirke’); Manado (Bindunbur Native Title Claim Group) v Western Australia [2019] FCA 
30 (‘Manado 2’); Taylor (Gangalidda People) v Queensland [2019] FCA 302 (‘Taylor 1’), Taylor 
(Gangalidda People) v Queensland [2019] FCA 297 (‘Taylor 2’); O’Connor (Palyku People) v 
Western Australia [2019] FCA 330 (‘O’Connor’).      
209  See especially Muriata [2018] FCA 1120; Lightning [2018] FCA 493; Finlay [2018] FCA 548; 
Hamlett [2018] FCA 545; Jack [2018] FCA 708; Glenn [2018] FCA 889; Breadon [2018] FCA 890; 
Torrens [2018] FCA 970; Holborow [2018] FCA 1108; Margarula [2018] FCA 1670; Drury [2018] 
FCA 1849; Oxenham [2018] FCA 1929; Sturt [2018] FCA 1923; Coulthard [2018] FCA 1993; Smirke 
[2018] FCA 2079; O’Connor [2019] FCA 330; Taylor 2 [2019] FCA 297. Cf Agius [2018] FCA 358; 
Doolan [2018] FCA 709; Croft [2018] FCA 552; Gordon [2018] FCA 1990. Contrast Manado 1 [2018] 
FCA 854; Muir [2018] FCA 1388; Wiggan [2018] FCA 1485; Wavehill [2018] FCA 1602; Forrest 
[2018] FCA 289; Street [2018] FCA 2019 (note the inclusive lists in some of these).   
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• explicit general exclusion (albeit variously placed) of commercial activities in non-
exclusive210 and/or exclusive211 determinations; 
• overarching qualification that the native title is subject to and exercisable in 
accordance with ‘traditional laws and customs’ in non-exclusive212 and/or 
exclusive213 determinations; 
• confinement to the use of ‘traditional resources’ in non-exclusive214 
determinations; 
• confinement to ‘personal, domestic and communal purposes’ in non-exclusive215 
and/or exclusive216 determinations.   
 
Some of the potential limitations in these terms might simply be reinterpreted. Prior to Akiba 
the term ‘traditional’ (and the ‘laws and customs’ it attached to) remained heavily loaded with 
the theorising of Ward and Yorta Yorta – anchored securely to pre-sovereignty times and 
implicitly very particularised. It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that this confinement 
would follow the communities (with determinations consistently deferring to the phrase) into 
the future, as something of a Trojan horse.217 Now, however, an overarching qualification that 
the determined native title is subject to and exercisable in accordance with ‘traditional laws 
and customs’ might be read in light of the clarification that it is to be defined by reference to 
                                       
210  Agius [2018] FCA 358; Muriata [2018] FCA 1120; Lightning [2018] FCA 493; Doolan [2018] FCA 
709; Croft [2018] FCA 552; Jack [2018] FCA 708; Glenn [2018] FCA 889; Breadon [2018] FCA 890; 
Holborow [2018] FCA 1108; Margarula [2018] FCA 1670; Drury [2018] FCA 1849; Coulthard 
[2018] FCA 1993; Gordon [2018] FCA 1990; Smirke [2018] FCA 2079; O’Connor [2019] FCA 330; 
Taylor 2 [2019] FCA 297. Contrast Forrest [2018] FCA 289; Hamlett [2018] FCA 545; Manado 1 
[2018] FCA 854; Muir [2018] FCA 1388; Wiggan [2018] FCA 1485; Wavehill [2018] FCA 1602; Sturt 
[2018] FCA 1923; Street [2018] FCA 2019. 
211  Muriata [2018] FCA 1120; Lightning [2018] FCA 493, however note the potential ambiguity of the 
formatting: at [6] of the determination; Croft [2018] FCA 552; Drury [2018] FCA 1849; Taylor 1 
[2019] FCA 302; Taylor 2 [2019] FCA 297, note again, however, the formatting: at [6] of each of the 
Taylor determinations. Contrast Forrest [2018] FCA 289; Hamlett [2018] FCA 545; Manado 1 [2018] 
FCA 854; Muir [2018] FCA 1388; Wiggan [2018] FCA 1485; Tex [2018] FCA 1591; Egan [2018] 
FCA 1945; Sturt [2018] FCA 1923; Jessell [2018] FCA 2047; Street [2018] FCA 2019; Gordon [2018] 
FCA 1990; Manado 2 [2019] FCA 30. 
212  Agius [2018] FCA 358; Muriata [2018] FCA 1120; Lightning [2018] FCA 493; Forrest [2018] FCA 
289; Doolan [2018] FCA 709; Finlay [2018] FCA 548; Croft [2018] FCA 552; Hamlett [2018] FCA 
545; Manado 1 [2018] FCA 854; Jack [2018] FCA 708; Glenn [2018] FCA 889; Breadon [2018] FCA 
890; Torrens [2018] FCA 970; Holborow [2018] FCA 1108; Muir [2018] FCA 1388; Wiggan [2018] 
FCA 1485; Margarula [2018] FCA 1670; Drury [2018] FCA 1849; Wavehill [2018] FCA 1602; 
Oxenham [2018] FCA 1929; Sturt [2018] FCA 1923; Street [2018] FCA 2019; Gordon [2018] FCA 
1990; Coulthard [2018] FCA 1993; Smirke [2018] FCA 2079; O’Connor [2019] FCA 330; Taylor 2 
[2019] FCA 297.       
213  Muriata [2018] FCA 1120; Lightning [2018] FCA 493; Forrest [2018] FCA 289; Finlay [2018] FCA 
548; Croft [2018] FCA 552; Hamlett [2018] FCA 545; Manado 1 [2018] FCA 854; Muir [2018] FCA 
1388; Wiggan [2018] FCA 1485; Tex [2018] FCA 1591; Drury [2018] FCA 1849; Egan [2018] FCA 
1945; Oxenham [2018] FCA 1929; Sturt [2018] FCA 1923; Jessell [2018] FCA 2047; Gordon [2018] 
FCA 1990; Street [2018] FCA 2019; Manado 2 [2019] FCA 30; Taylor 2 [2019] FCA 297; Taylor 1 
[2019] FCA 302. 
214  Finlay [2018] FCA 548; Torrens [2018] FCA 970; Holborow [2018] FCA 1108; Oxenham [2018] FCA 
1929; Gordon [2018] FCA 1990; Smirke [2018] FCA 2079; O’Connor [2019] FCA 330.     
215  Finlay [2018] FCA 548; Torrens [2018] FCA 970 (in the context of water); Oxenham [2018] FCA 
1929. 
216  Finlay [2018] FCA 548; Oxenham [2018] FCA 1929. 
217  Cf the comments in Walker (n 17) 14, 20–1. 
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‘underlying rights’ rather than specific exercises of them – and a fuller respect for the prior 
dominion inherent in original custodianship of lands. In the case of non-exclusive title, this de-
focuses any limitation. In the case of exclusive title, this brings us within reach of the 
comprehensive interest proffered by the comparative jurisprudence and early Australian 
dissents. In the new legal landscape this common qualification, sheered of undue external 
limitations it might invoke, perhaps rightly becomes essentially an acknowledgment of the 
community’s internal control of inter se organisation and entitlement. An anti-waste type 
protection might conceivably be found within this qualification, given that it is not a reason to 
withhold an ‘any purpose’ definition of rights.218 If this were to carry an element of external 
limitation on the native title, this would be not dissimilar to the ‘irreconcilable uses’ limitation 
found in the Delgamuukw doctrine219 and now rationalised in Canada on principles of 
intergenerational equity. Irrespective of the appropriateness of such a limitation, it has not 
proved in practice to be a great source of contention in Canada.220  
 
The amorphous confinement of use to ‘traditional resources’, where it is found, might similarly 
be read in light of the de-focusing language and logic of Akiba. It may prove to be more 
obstinate given the deliberate ‘dating’ of the term ‘traditional’ in Yorta Yorta; loosening the 
restriction might depend on how broadly ‘resources’ can be delineated.221 Yet it is important 
to remember here the emerging understanding that the scope of underlying rights is not 
dependent on ‘activity evidence’ (as explored further below). It is interesting that this version 
of limitation only appears to have been added in respect of non-exclusive native title in the 
2018 determinations – a vestige it seems of the piñata theory of partial extinguishment 
(discussed above),222 but one that can now be mitigated by the ‘re-aggregation’ of rights offered 
by Akiba.    
 
Implicit exclusions of commercial activity might similarly be corrected, or partially corrected, 
by the broadening tenor of thinking. For example, a confinement of use to ‘personal, domestic 
and communal purposes’ can now be read in light of the fact that communal commercial rights 
are recognised.223 Some difficult interpretive exercises might lay ahead,224 however the legal, 
moral and economic logic of the Akiba correction should in time produce some significant 
momentum. Certainly it seems that implicit inclusions of commercial activity225 can now be 
readily embraced.   
                                       
218  See, eg, Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [126] (North J) (approving comments of Finn J in Akiba v Queensland 
[No 3] (2010) 204 FCR 1, 133–4 [523]–[524]).  But see the doubts expressed on this point in McCabe, 
‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 134) 71.  
219  See Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010. See also Hewitt (n 136) 261. 
220  For fuller discussion of the development of this limitation in Canada, see Sharon Mascher and Simon 
Young, ‘Rights-Based “Recognition”: The Canadian Experience’ in Simon Young, Jennifer Nielsen 
and Jeremy Patrick (eds), Constitutional Recognition of First Peoples in Australia: Theories and 
Comparative Perspectives (Federation Press, 2016) 176, 192–205. 
221  Note in this regard the robust approach taken by Mansfield J in Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group 
v Northern Territory (2016) 255 FCR 228 (discussed above). 
222  Compare in this regard the earlier thinking that recognition of commercial rights necessarily depended 
on an entitlement to exclusive possession (discussed above in Part IV). 
223  Moreover, as Strelein has argued, the notion of ‘communal needs’ can logically cover economic 
development needs: Strelein, ‘The Right to Resources and the Right to Trade’ (n 18) 51. 
224  As another example of possible implied exclusion, an ostensibly broad right (ie, covering commercial 
uses) might be implicitly limited by a reference in later clauses to sharing or exchanging ‘subsistence 
and other traditional resources’: see the discussion in McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 134) 68. 
225  See the older examples noted in Strelein, ‘The Right to Resources and the Right to Trade’ (n 18) 50. 
 28 
 
The remaining limitations noted above raise more difficult questions. The highly detailed 
itemisation of permissible activities in many non-exclusive determinations,226 and the express 
excision of commercial activities in many exclusive and non-exclusive determinations, are far 
more difficult to work around.227 Yet for various reasons the deficit now clearly visible in the 
large body of past determinations cannot be ignored. Obviously, there is no logic in imagining 
now that these communities’ connection with lands and waters was in all cases somehow more 
limited and specific than that of the post-Akiba claimants.  A proper respect for these 
communities, and for the integrity of the native title regime, requires some careful review and 
action. In practical terms, the relative strengths of a community’s surviving native title rights 
(as determined) can be critically important in various future negotiations.228 Moreover, as we 
now enter a new era, with a focus on valuing and compensating for post-1975 extinguishment, 
it will be important to proceed from a settled and accurate understanding of the extant rights 
that have suffered recent interference. Just as importantly, the terms of past determinations 
(through variation and the freezing of things despite unpredictable future context) might seem 
to unduly place communities on a path to internal and external conflict229 – and this must be 
borne in mind in any retrospective review.   
 
The old constrictions in the Australian doctrine are deeply embedded, and the substantial 
precedent of past determinations will take some dislodging (particularly in negotiations) – as 
evidenced by the inertia in the 2018 determinations surveyed above. It would seem that 
inaction, or piecemeal action, will just allow the problem to compound. Clearly there is little 
to be gained by drawing communities and courts back to the task of formal proof of reframed 
claims. Given this, and the sobering reality that similar questions might arise in future 
reckonings with past conclusions on extinguishment, supplementary consultation and 
negotiation must be the way forward. The courts have the tools in section 13 of the Native Title 
Act 1993 (Cth) to reopen finalised determinations (including simply in ‘the interests of 
justice’),230 but it must be hoped that such a process can be approached in a general and 
consultative way, rather than left to communities to activate – in a sense to begin again. A 
general process could benefit from the significant trans-Australian anthropological evidence 
produced in recent cases (see below), and the logical starting presumption that communities 
across Australia generally enjoyed a similarly comprehensive connection with and dominion 
over lands. Presumptions led us in to this legal, moral and economic corner – and informed 
presumptions might lead us out. 
 
VI IMPLICATIONS FOR PROOF 
                                       
226  For older examples of itemisation in exclusive determinations, see ibid 44, 50–1. 
227  Assuming that a link to itemised activities is required: note however, the possible alternative approach 
alluded to in ibid 51. 
228  For example, there is evidence of significant discrepancy in resources driven agreements across the 
country – and one identified factor behind this is the relative strength of remaining native title rights: 
see Lily O’Neill, ‘The Role of State Governments in Native Title Negotiations: A Tale of Two 
Agreements’ (2015/2016) 18(2) Australian Indigenous Law Review 29. 
229  See Walker (n 17) 20–1. 
230  See Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 13(5) – and note discussion in McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 
134) 72 (particularly the point that implementation of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
recommendation to substitute a new s 223(2) – expressly recognising possible ‘any purpose’ rights, 
including commercial rights, and including references to ‘trading’ in the express examples – would 
potentially make the case for s 13 variation stronger). See also Warrie (2017) 365 ALR 624 (in the 
context of a reassessment (some years later) of ‘exclusivity’ under particular traditional laws and 
customs: 716–22 [360]–[382] (Rares J)).  
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A   The Establishment of Broader Rights 
The initial question, in the context of proof, is how are broader Akiba-style rights to be 
established? Obviously, the conceptual advances explored above (in the context of content) 
would be quickly denuded of meaning if specific evidence of all ‘exercises’ was still needed to 
prove the broader ‘underlying right’. Theoretically, such itemised proof was always possible – 
but of course the tendency to require such specific evidence, and the burden this imposed,231 
helped to underwrite the confinement of content. While in Akiba itself there was significant 
evidence of commercial activity (the trading of marine resources),232 Akiba’s broader framing 
of rights necessarily led us back to perennial concerns about any insistence on specific 
evidence: why should variations of significant traditional activities, for which there was no 
need or no opportunity in the past, be withheld from the contemporary community?233 A 
broader framing of rights must be justified, but it would seem that this should logically be 
assisted by the strengthening respect for the comprehensive connections underlying original 
custodianship – and indeed would often be more easy to support with evidence from claimant 
witnesses than disaggregated and decontextualised specific entitlements.234 
In the critical Pilki decision,235 where these questions were squarely in issue, North J dismissed 
the State’s attempt to narrow the right by pointing to a lack of evidence about actual commercial 
activity.236 He rejected the logic of a requirement that ‘activity’ is necessary to establish that 
the right exists.237 His own focus was on the existence of the right under established ‘traditional 
laws and customs’ (albeit activity might assist with this inquiry), and he noted that freehold 
owners need not show the exercise of all their rights to prove they exist.238 On this approach, 
and acknowledging that the country in question was harsh, sparsely populated and had limited 
resources to be traded,239 he found particularly on the expert evidence that the broadly framed 
right did exist here.240 He felt the State had not engaged properly with the expert evidence, and 
noted that there was both substantive evidence about relevant laws and customs and (if 
necessary) examples of relevant activities – all supported by the expert evidence.241 And his 
Honour dismissed the relevance of constraints under ‘internal rules’.242   
                                       
231  See the discussion in Lauder and Strelein (n 135) 14; and the conspicuous example considered there 
from Yarmirr v Northern Territory [No 2] (1998) 82 FCR 533. 
232  Akiba v Queensland [No 3] (2010) 204 FCR 1, 134 [526] (Finn J). See also the discussion in Brennan 
(n 6) 34 ff. 
233  See, eg, Lauder and Strelein (n 135) 15; Finn, ‘Mabo into the Future’ (n 128) 6. And note the 
comments of Kirby J in Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 243–5 [569]–[575] – discussed in detail above at Part 
IV(A). 
234  As to the latter point, see further McCabe, ‘Pilki and Birriliburu’ (n 134) 67. 
235  Pilki [2014] FCA 714.  
236  Ibid [118]–[127].    
237  Ibid [118]. See also Birriliburu [2014] FCA 715, [89] (North J). 
238  Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [118]. See also Birriliburu [2014] FCA 715, [89]–[90] (North J). 
239  See Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [122] (North J). See also Birriliburu [2014] FCA 715, [92] (North J). 
240  See Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [116] (North J).  
241  See ibid [123]–[124] (North J). And his Honour found that the pre-sovereignty and post-sovereignty 
activity reflected a ‘continuum of trading activity of a similar nature’: at [125]. See also Birriliburu 
[2014] FCA 715, [91], [93], [100] (North J). 
242  See Pilki [2014] FCA 714, [126] (North J). See also Birriliburu [2014] FCA 715, [95] (North J). 
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In the Pilki appeal, Dowsett and Jagot JJ similarly held that proof of trading/commercial 
activity was not an essential precondition to the establishment of the right.243 Dowsett J 
emphasised that the question will be whether the evidence establishes that ‘a claimed right or 
interest is recognised by traditional law and custom’, but noted that a claim group need not 
prove a ‘specific canon of traditional law and custom’ dealing with commercial resource use.244 
Yet the detail of their Honours’ reasoning left the Pilki precedent looking somewhat fact-
specific. Jagot J had particularly referred (as context for the rejection of any excision of 
commercial purposes) to: the relative lack of challenge to the Pilki evidence (and the strength 
of the central cultural evidence); the evidence about the ‘opportunistic nature’ of resource use 
by these societies; the location of the claim area in a larger overall system (and its relationship 
with ancient trade routes); and the limited resources available.245   
The reasoning in the succeeding decision of Rrumburriya Borroloola Claim Group v Northern 
Territory246 left a similar sense – Mansfield J noting at the outset that the traditional laws and 
customs and expert evidence examined in Pilki did not necessarily ‘transport’ to the present 
claim.247 Yet his Honour clearly stated his view that ‘the difference between the existence of a 
right under traditional laws and customs is (as North J said) logically separate from the fact of 
its exercise … it is the possession of the right, not its exercise, which is the proper question’.248 
He ultimately confirmed it will be necessary to show a traditional right to take resources – and 
that evidence of exercise might inform the inquiry, as might expert evidence (as in Pilki) – but 
emphasised that each case will depend on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced.249 In 
this instance, particular reference was made to evidence of historical trading activities with 
Macassans250 (carefully located within the ‘normative system’ of traditional laws and 
customs251), which was considered to be the exercise of unrestricted rights to control the region 
and to access and take the resources without restriction.252 In Narrier, where a broadly-cast 
right to resources was upheld again, Mortimer J was less circumspect in seeking the broad right 
under traditional law and custom (by reference to cultural and expert evidence) and rejecting 
any general requirement of activity evidence253 – expressing a preference254 for the key 
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statements on point by Dowsett and Jagot JJ in the Pilki Appeal over those of Barker J255 and 
sitting more easily with the tenor of North J’s original judgments.      
Consistently with the analysis above, in commentary on Pilki and Birriliburu, McCabe 
emphasised several lessons for future claimants of Akiba-style rights.256 He noted that in the 
absence of significant ‘activity’ evidence, the evidence of relevant ‘traditional laws and 
customs’ will need to be strong.257 In this regard, the depth of witnesses’ general cultural 
knowledge will be important (the strength of evidence from these less impacted communities 
was noted in these cases),258 and any State concessions about continuity will potentially also 
be significant. It was also emphasised that the interpretation and context provided by expert 
evidence (for the pivotal cultural evidence) will be particularly important; the quality and 
importance of the anthropological evidence particularly in Pilki (about the nature of authority 
over lands and the history of trade across Australia) was highlighted by the courts.259   
 
These points are well made, but it might be added at this juncture that given the emergence of 
a new respect for the original dominion underlying native title (replacing the scepticism of past 
approaches), the advances in these cases should perhaps not be so difficult to take to other 
claims. There is less room now to suppose that a particular community, under its traditional 
laws and customs, enjoyed a lesser custodianship over its lands or waters260 – at least where 
the only reason for so concluding is a weakness in contemporary evidence born of more 
significant or more prolonged western impact. Akiba may yet prove to be more of a tipping 
point then we realise.       
 
B   Implications for Proof of Continuity/Connection? 
 
The most significant challenge for many communities is the distinct task of establishing 
continuity – of connection, normative system, society, traditional laws and customs, or some 
combination of these (depending on the focus of argument and analysis). The state 
‘concessions’ alluded to above will often not be made, and there is no argument to be had about 
the niceties of native title content for a community declared to have been ‘washed away’ by 
the ‘tide of history’.261 As noted above the tighter Australian thinking, with its exacting focus 
on specific ‘traditional laws and customs’, crystallised somewhat in the context of ‘continuity’ 
requirements in the High Court’s Yorta Yorta decision of 2002 – principally through the 
Court’s emphasis on survival of ‘system’ and ‘society’ (and apparent interpretation of those 
concepts). Perhaps the most difficult question in the wake of Akiba is whether the renaissance 
in Australian thinking holds some significance for this much maligned ‘continuity’ inquiry. 
Once again it is important to note that there have long been glimpses of broader thinking on 
continuity. Some of this came in the form of rights/exercise type distinctions. In Yorta Yorta 
itself, on the issue of ‘interruption’, it was at least noted in the leading judgment that the non-
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exercise of rights and interests did not necessarily answer the relevant statutory questions – 
which are directed to ‘possession’ of rights and interests and the existence of a ‘connection’.262 
Gaudron and Kirby JJ, in confirming the sufficiency of a ‘spiritual connection’ in their 
dissenting judgment, emphasised the requirements of ‘possession’ of rights and interests (rather 
than their exercise) and ‘connection’ (rather than traditional connection or the specifics of 
utilisation and occupation).263   
Signs of broader thinking on continuity also came in other forms, particularly in the lower 
courts where these issues emerged earlier. Examples are found in periodic emphasis on the 
need only for a mere spiritual connection, in various returns to Brennan J’s own ameliorating 
terminology on these issues,264 in occasional more selective and discerning approaches to 
continuity and connection inquiries, in calls for evidential flexibility, and of course in actual 
attempted accommodation of specific change or interruption.265 The most prominent early 
opposition to the strict thinking came in Black CJ’s dissent in the first appeal upholding the 
Yorta Yorta trial defeat.266 His Honour was insistent upon the need to accommodate change,267 
and preferred a liberal interpretation of the concept of ‘tradition’ in the statutory criteria – 
arguing that it was wrong to see ‘traditional’ as a concept concerned with what is ‘dead, frozen 
or otherwise incapable of change’.268   
In the High Court, Kirby J’s similar emphasis on the need to accommodate change, in his 
dissent on content in Ward, also had implications for proof.269 However, Gaudron and Kirby 
JJ addressed the matter of proof more directly in their Yorta Yorta dissent. Their Honours 
preferred a more flexible, variable and self-identifying notion of ‘society’ (or ‘community’) 
than the Yorta Yorta majority judges.270 Moreover, they argued that on the ordinary meaning 
of ‘traditional’ (‘handed down from generation to generation’),271 and particularly in light of 
the impact of European settlement, laws and customs may properly be described as ‘traditional’ 
under section 223(1) notwithstanding that they do not correspond exactly with pre-settlement 
versions.272 Their Honours suggested, then, that to be ‘traditional’, laws and customs should 
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268 Ibid 256.  
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have their ‘origins’ in the past and differences should constitute ‘adaptations, alterations, 
modifications or extensions made in accordance with the shared values or the customs and 
practices of the people who acknowledge and observe those laws and customs’.273 
Interestingly, the leading majority judgment in Yorta Yorta touched upon similar logic – 
namely the possibility that alteration, ‘development’ and/or interruption in traditional law and 
custom might be accommodated where it was contemplated by the traditional law and 
custom.274 
After Yorta Yorta, some succeeding lower cases embraced the re-rationalised stricter 
approach.275 Yet once again, others continued to search for flexibility even within the tightened 
parameters. Despite the enticing threads of dissent left in Yorta Yorta itself, or perhaps because 
of their appearance in dissents, efforts to liberalise the continuity tests remained somewhat 
haphazard. There were attempts to apply a more holistic ‘connection’ requirement,276 and 
emphasis (again) on the sufficiency of spiritual connection277 and continuity in knowledge278 
(as distinct from lifestyle and practices). There were efforts to find the survival of a ‘society’ 
in the continuance of ‘some’ traditional laws and customs (in lieu of a broad and general 
search).279 There were instances of a more deliberately ‘compartmental’ approach to proof – 
ie, requiring only continuity in the laws and customs underpinning the surviving native title 
rights.280 There was also some rejection of any strict search for uniformity (in observance and 
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acknowledgement);281 acknowledgement of outside interference and modern 
impracticalities;282 and (of course) attempts at positive accommodation of actual change.283  
There was a conspicuous pull back on these various efforts in the Full Federal Court appeal in 
Bennell,284 which perhaps only served to highlight the strains and significance of the Yorta 
Yorta approach – at least to commentators and judges writing extra-judicially.285  
C   Extending the Logic of Akiba’s Correction 
As explored earlier the significant advance in Akiba, a determined distinction between 
‘underlying rights’ and their ‘exercise’, emerged from extinguishment debates and has begun 
to impact upon native title content (and upon the means of establishing rights). Whilst 
connection issues were largely conceded in Akiba itself, owing particularly to previous 
determinations in the region,286 a critical question now is whether the Akiba logic might usher 
in progress on the ‘torturous’ continuity test. At this point it is relevant to note that not only did 
the tightening emphasis on ‘systems’, ‘society’ and their survival in Yorta Yorta (with attendant 
particularity) seem to immediately narrow the entryway, it also risked some detachment of 
continuity inquiries from any broadening thinking on content. The substitution of the 
‘intersection of systems’ focus (for the original ‘burden on sovereign title’ idea which became 
less useful around the time of the Yarmirr offshore litigation) meant that rather than reflecting 
on what might sustain more broadly defined rights (as they emerge), the law could allow itself 
to remain tangled up in the fine details of specific community laws and customs.287   
Perhaps in part for this reason, judges appear to have contented themselves recently with 
continued pursuit of the splayed lines of liberality referred to above, and the ‘continuity’ tests 
seem not to have yet been meaningfully impacted by the significant conceptual evolutions 
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going on around them.288 Some of the recent specific attempts at liberality have been significant 
– for example in Croft v South Australia,289 Narrier,290 and Ashwin v Western Australia.291 Yet 
the Yorta Yorta test continues to be a heavy burden for many communities.292 A number of 
these cases also highlight the disadvantages (noted earlier) of a particular and exacting process 
that tends to discourage aggregated or regional claims.293   
Despite the apparent tenacity of the core Yorta Yorta thinking, the legal context for these 
inquiries has now changed. To put the point at its simplest, the ‘traditional laws and customs’ 
that have been broadened somewhat by the Akiba correction are logically the same ‘traditional 
laws and customs’ that underlie the test for continuity – whether manifested in requirements of 
‘connection’, survival of ‘system’ or ‘society’, or simply continued acknowledgement and 
observance. More broadly speaking, the logic underlying the Akiba correction is that 
segmentation and specificity (particularly if driven by western legal and economic distinctions) 
is not properly reflective of the First Peoples’ relationships with land and waters, or the 
resilience of those relationships. Accordingly, it would seem inescapable that the new thinking 
should also have some effect on continuity inquiries. 
If we are seeking broader ‘underlying rights’ (looking past the detail and fate of particular 
‘exercises’), and therefore examining and interpreting ‘traditional laws and customs’ at a higher 
level of abstraction, we are retreating from the particularity of the Australian legal history. 
From the close vantage point of old approaches we saw interference, interruption and change 
everywhere; the former two were translated too often into extinguishment or expiry, and the 
latter was often viewed as culturally disingenuous or even a threatened resurgence of the 
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‘system’ supposedly nullified at the point of sovereignty. Yet a higher vantage point refocusses 
attention on the deeper-set, less fragile, less stylised and less transient features of the First 
Peoples’ relationships with lands and waters. Accordingly, there is inherent room for specific 
changes, interruptions and interferences – and they logically become less relevant to any 
assessment of the survival of the interest.294   
Most directly, the evolution of thinking on content has clear implications here. Under the less 
exacting framework, now reflected in key lower court decisions and the wording of more 
progressive recent determinations,295 the broadly identified rights are inherently more adaptive. 
So too are the more readily recognised ‘exclusive possession’ titles (now often approximating 
or approaching a comprehensive interest), and the frequency of these should only increase with 
the higher bar set for past extinguishment. In these contexts, most particularly post-Akiba, 
changes or interruptions to the specifics of lifestyle, access, nature and purpose of use, location 
and manner of use, and/or inter se organisation and entitlement (which may previously have 
been fashioned into evidence of discontinuity), are now logically more incidental. Conversely, 
more practices and contemporary variations are positive evidence of continued enjoyment of 
the broadly cast underlying rights, and of continued acknowledgement and observance of the 
attendant ‘traditional laws and customs’. Some of these supporting practices and purposes 
might not yet even have been conceived of – certainly not by the western jurisprudence. It 
should also be noted here that such broadening of inquiry can only encourage more aggregated, 
possibly regional claims.296    
In concrete terms, using the Akiba example, evidence of continuity in the ‘traditional laws and 
customs’ (and connection) supporting a broad right to take resources for any purpose might 
logically look different to that sought in respect of a right to take for limited purposes a 
particular species at a particular location (such is the detail to which past cases have sometimes 
descended).297 Moreover, the reasoning that in a particular case asserted rights and interests are 
‘contemporary’ rather than traditional298 will now be, both with regards to content and 
continuity, less apposite. Indeed, the contemporary community practices that have been 
dismissed as ‘revivalism’ in past cases, including the trial decision in Yorta Yorta,299 might 
now require more careful thought. Also, any dismissal of remnant or inconsistent specific 
knowledge300 might similarly need to be reconsidered as we turn the focus to the broader 
underpinnings of that specific and inherently fragile detail. This broadened thinking can apply, 
of course, not only to contemporary continuity – but also to the ‘chain’ of continuity that we 
are told is required to reach back across the generations. 
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The Griffiths compensation decision shores up the broadening thinking on native title content 
(as discussed earlier), and hence the extrapolated implications for continuity (argued above). 
In particular, the High Court’s postulation in non-economic loss calculations of a freehold 
equivalent valuation for an exclusive interest supports a broader contemporary 
conceptualisation of the nature and depth of the native title interest.301 As noted above, the 
Court’s reduction of the award for economic loss on the facts (alongside its upholding of the 
significant cultural loss award) might seem to shift emphasis back from broader economic 
value to unique, non-economic and spiritual significance.302 Yet it is important to remember 
that the Court was ultimately considering the itemised list of non-exclusive and non-
commercial rights presented to it303 – and a community with strong and relatively 
untrammelled traditional connections. The conclusion that only ‘simple interest’ was payable 
(on the economic loss), and particularly the degree of focus in this litigation upon the strength 
and purity of extant cultural and spiritual connections (in the consideration of non-economic 
loss),304 will inevitably be debated as the implications of the High Court decision are 
explored.305 The risk, perhaps, is something of a ‘second coming’ for the Yorta Yorta mindset. 
Whilst the impact might be offset this time by greater economic loss assessments in more 
densely settled regions, it is hoped that there might be a clearer legal acknowledgment now that 
loss of ‘connection’ is not confined to remote communities.   
Working back now to the recent extinguishment cases – ironically the source of the current 
renaissance in Australian thinking – they have told us that significant regulation of activities 
relating to a particular resource (Akiba, Karpany), or suppression of all activity in particular 
locations (Brown), even broadly drawn (Congoo), are now less likely to effect extinguishment 
of any underlying rights. Logically non-extinguishment might not conclusively establish 
survival of connection (to invert the logic applied in Fejo), however these cases collectively do 
indicate that we are now looking to broader and deeper entitlements as the source and essence 
of native title. They thereby build in greater resilience, and adaptive and regenerative capacity, 
in the face of significant interference or interruption (even with lasting impacts) – and 
implicitly support a broader approach to requisite continuity. More specifically, these cases 
further de-emphasise physical presence and specific practices (including in situations of 
significant suppression), and cast some doubt on the appropriateness of any geographic 
particularity in continuity and connection inquiries.306 Moreover, these cases might seem to 
                                       
301  See also ibid 237–8 [96]–[97] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ) (including reference to 
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add further to the difficulty of maintaining the position that the ‘reasons’ for interruption or 
change are irrelevant to its legal significance.307        
Perhaps the central question underlying these issues is whether we can and should now properly 
reconnect ‘continuity’ inquiries to the remainder of the doctrine. As noted above, the ‘survival 
of systems’ focus appeared to permit and encourage some disconnection – and hence some 
calcification of the continuity methodology despite the surrounding progress. Given the nature 
of the conceptual evolution in recent years, it is difficult to see how the doctrine can remain 
committed to specifics when considering continuity of ‘connection’ or ‘acknowledgement and 
observance’. The rights are more broadly conceived, proof of those broader rights does not 
require evidence of specific exercises, and extinguishment is to be adjudged by reference to the 
broader and more resilient nature of these rights. Does the requirement of continuity somehow 
provide a last safe refuge for the old thinking? As emphasised above, the requirement of 
sustained ‘acknowledgment and observance’ deals in the same ‘laws and customs’ that have 
been broadened for other purposes, and the connection sought is one ‘by those laws and 
customs’.308 However, semantics aside, on the issue of ‘connection’, the recent jurisprudence 
has effectively revealed more of the connection with lands and waters – by refocusing on the 
underlying rights and tenets of the Indigenous relationship with lands and waters. ‘Connection’ 
is now itself more adaptive and resilient, and it would seem more readily evidenced by a 
broader range of contemporary priorities and undertakings.  
It might similarly be said that more of the ‘system’ and ‘society’ – and their adaptability and 
resilience – has also been revealed. If the interposed emphasis on ‘system’ and ‘society’ in 
Yorta Yorta is itself now the source of particularity, then the logic of that methodology should 
be revisited. Apart from the fact that all of these continuity inquiries were built around the same 
(now broadening) ‘traditional laws and customs’, where a community has established a broad 
subsisting right under relevant subsisting traditional laws and customs, is an additional 
detached and more exacting inquiry into their ‘system’ or ‘society’ needed to sustain that right? 
That would seem to be unduly onerous and intrusive – at the very least for a remnant title where 
the ‘loss of control’ has been accepted. If the more exacting inquiry is considered to be 
somehow required by the group or communal nature of interest, then we appear to be 
accidentally fashioning a jurisprudence for ‘self-government’ claims long before recognising 
that possibility – and with some unexplained rigid preference for historical organisational 
structures over contemporary integrated frameworks.309 
Obviously, some of this broader thinking was evident or implicit (in various forms) in the 
earlier opposition to the strict Australian approach to continuity (explored above). Now, this 
thinking has a lever, and a considerable prospective importance. These arguments also lead us, 
however, to the most difficult of the issues canvassed in this article. What of the communities 
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that have already been tried and stopped on the Yorta Yorta test? Some have navigated around 
and beyond the ‘obstacle’ that native title had become for them – by reason of the converging 
challenges of ‘continuity’ and vast historic (non-compensable) extinguishment in more settled 
areas – most prominently the Noongar nation in the south-west of the country.310 The largely 
positive and broad-thinking role played by the State of Western Australia in that settlement, 
and correlatively by the Victorian government in the establishment of the Traditional Owner 
Settlement Act 2010 (Vic), stand out as the best responses to the difficulties of a deeply 
problematic threshold ‘continuity’ test and the weight of historic extinguishment in earlier 
settled and more impacted regions of the country.         
     
VII   CONCLUSION 
As noted at the outset of this article, as we move beyond the 25th anniversary of the Mabo 
decision there is a growing chorus of concern that in the exacting detail of our native title law 
we have strayed too far from the logic, sanctity and opportunity of ‘ownership’. The resulting 
legal burdens, the dismantling of economic potential, and the associated intrusion, division and 
differentiation has weighed heavily on many communities. Moreover, this restrictive approach 
has regrettably allowed some of the self-serving legal blindness of past times to stow away in 
what was to be the flagship of Australian ‘decolonisation’.  
 
We have at various times blamed, for the difficulties, the terms of the Native Title Act, the 
adversarialism of court process, the overzealous explication of community histories, and the 
mindsets of government respondents. Yet close examination reveals that the tightening of 
approach was to some extent an accident of the Australian legal history. Viewed in this light, 
and in light of the steady accumulation of dissenting voices, the Akiba correction was no second 
‘judicial revolution’311 – it was a natural and inevitable evolution, and a profoundly important 
one.  
 
The Akiba case recovered a fuller respect for the holistic relationships and dominion that 
underlay First Peoples’ original custodianship of land and waters. While a number of dissenting 
and lower court judges had previously attempted to draw this out of the Australian 
constrictions, Akiba’s critical correction found traction. The clear and simple distinction 
between ‘underlying rights’ and ‘exercises’ of them held many attractions for the beleaguered 
Australian jurisprudence. The courts had long struggled to find a principled accommodation of 
‘change’ in native title law, despite a long history of rhetorical acknowledgement.312 The Akiba 
distinction achieves just that – through its de-focusing of inquiries. Considerable change is 
naturally accommodated – but with some definitional control left in the hands of the courts and 
the vexed issues of post-sovereignty accrual of new rights (and the possible reanimation of the 
Indigenous legal system) neatly left to one side. The ‘traditional laws and customs’ 
methodology is left fully intact (even the strict dating of that notion in Yorta Yorta), and the 
edicts of Ward about the error of drawing assumptions from ideas of ‘ownership’ is avoided, 
by a simple anchoring of the ‘underlying rights’ in broader traditional laws and customs. And 
while the ‘assumptions’ of ownership (so well established in the comparative jurisprudence) 
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do continue to seep into the Australian conception of exclusive native title, Akiba gives us the 
critical tool to begin dismantling the piñata theory of partial extinguishment that has so 
pervaded the many determinations of non-exclusive native title. Incidentally, the new resilience 
that the Akiba distinction has helped afford to native title, in the face of quite significant 
suppression, may well result in a new resilience for the original exclusivity of that title. As 
noted earlier in this article, the threads of broader thinking are converging on a more principled 
Australian approach.  
 
There is considerable irony in the fact that the Akiba correction came from the stable of High 
Court extinguishment cases. As explored earlier, the initial strong focus on extinguishment in 
the formative cases was a significant contributor to the constrictions in the Australian doctrine. 
Most particularly, it encouraged (in various ways) over-specificity in the definition of the 
interest – to which proof of rights, and by association proof of continuity and connection, were 
somewhat beholden. Now the extinguishment jurisprudence is driving the correction – the 
proverbial tail is wagging the dog back the other way. Unfortunately, however, Yorta Yorta’s 
interposing of a focus on ‘survival of system’ in continuity inquiries tended to detach those 
inquiries from future progress on issues of definition and content. So, while the mood of dissent 
on content (and indeed proof of rights) quickly found a clear path forward in the Akiba logic, 
the principles of continuity have been somewhat left behind – and lower court judges left to 
continue a haphazard resistance.  
 
This then is a critical issue in the wake of Akiba: does the renaissance in Australian thinking 
hold some significance for continuity inquiries, and hence some relevance for the communities 
burdened by the rigorous threshold standards laid down in Yorta Yorta? The argument in this 
article is that the Akiba logic can so extend – to questions of continuity (in their various forms). 
In this way, it can at the very least galvanise and organise the accumulating opposition to the 
strictness of Yorta Yorta, and indeed perhaps unlock new lines of thinking. Semantically, the 
‘traditional laws and customs’ that have been broadened by Akiba are the same ‘traditional 
laws and customs’ that underlie the test for continuity in its various manifestations. More 
broadly, Akiba rejects any insistence on segmentation and specificity as being not properly 
reflective of the First Peoples’ relationships with land and waters (and the resilience of those 
relationships) – and this thinking should logically also have some effect on continuity inquiries. 
Akiba refocuses attention on the broader and deeper-set features of these relationships.  
Accordingly, there is inherently more room for changes, interruptions and interferences (and 
they logically become less relevant to the survival of the interest).  Correlatively, more 
contemporary variations are positive evidence of continued enjoyment of the broadly cast 
underlying rights and of continuity in acknowledgement and observance of the relevant 
traditional laws and customs. Moreover, the particularity of old should not be given safe 
harbour in notions of ‘connection’, ‘system’ or ‘society’; the recent jurisprudence has 
effectively revealed more of the connection (and a broader connection) with lands and waters, 
and more of the ‘system’ and ‘society’ (and their adaptability and resilience). The law might 
now be better equipped to recognise that ‘connection’ to land and waters is not confined to 
remote and little-impacted First Peoples.   
 
A more intractable difficulty canvassed in this article resides in the fact that the ink has long 
dried on many determinations. The survey above of determinations from 2018 to early 2019, 
while illustrating some post-Akiba expansion of thinking, also reveals very clearly the 
consistency and tenacity of the old approaches and the potential pre-Akiba ‘deficit’ we are now 
left with. Some of the potential limitations in the terms of these determinations might simply 
be reinterpreted post-Akiba – the Akiba correction might dismantle both piñatas and some 
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Trojan horses. Yet the highly detailed itemisation of permissible activities in many non-
exclusive determinations, and the express general exclusion of commercial activities in many 
exclusive and non-exclusive determinations, are more difficult to work around. These are 
important matters, warranting careful consideration and review, and ultimately it might seem 
some supplementary consultation and negotiation. Apart from the unnecessary potential for 
future disputation, the relative strength of a community’s native title rights (surviving or 
recently interfered with) can be critically important in future negotiations and/or compensation 
claims. 
 
An even more intractable difficulty, if that is possible, lies in the fact that many communities 
have already been tested and turned away from native title processes by reason of the Yorta 
Yorta restrictions. Which claims might have been shored up by the broader thinking, carried 
logically across from Akiba, is a question we do not wish to litigate. It would seem that the 
time is here for some closer national attention to the initiatives in the south west of the country 
(the Noongar settlement) and the Victorian regime established under the Traditional Owner 
Settlement Act 2010 (Vic). In considering these difficult questions, and the issue of existing 
determinations, it must be remembered that the brighter path ahead has been built on the labour 
and loss of those that came before. 
 
   
 
 
